Assurance of quality-of-service configurations in a network

ABSTRACT

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for assurance of quality-of-service configurations in a network. In some examples, a system obtains a logical model of a software-defined network, the logical model including rules specified for the software-defined network, the logical model being based on a schema defining manageable objects and object properties for the software-defined network. The system also obtains, for each node in the software-defined network, a respective hardware model, the respective hardware model including rules rendered at the node based on a respective node-specific representation of the logical model. Based on the logical model and the respective hardware model, the system can perform an equivalency check between the rules in the logical model and the rules in the respective hardware model to determine whether the logical model and the respective hardware model contain configuration inconsistencies.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of, and priority to, U.S.Provisional Patent Application No. 62/487,930, filed on Apr. 20, 2017,entitled “POLICY ASSURANCE OF QUALITY-OF-SERVICE CONFIGURATIONS IN ANETWORK”, the contents of which are hereby expressly incorporated byreference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present technology pertains to network configuration andtroubleshooting, and more specifically to assurance ofquality-of-service configurations in a network.

BACKGROUND

Network operators configure policies for specifying Quality-of-Service(QoS) in order to prioritize traffic in a network. A real-time streamingapplication, for example, may require that its traffic be given priorityin the network. Such priority can be accomplished by configuringspecific QoS policies in the network. Network operators can configurethe QoS policies to be propagated or implemented by nodes, such asswitches, in the network. The nodes can render the QoS policies in theirmemories (e.g., TCAM memories) as rules, for example.

Unfortunately, QoS policies in a network can require a great deal ofmanual effort to configure, and are often error prone. Further, even ifcorrectly configured, QoS policies may not be appropriately rendered bythe nodes in the network. For example, a QoS policy may not result inthe correct TCAM rule on a switch. This can be a result of variousissues such as network faults, connectivity problems, device or softwarebugs, etc. If an error occurs on the field, network operators mayreactively respond to the error by sending test traffic between ports ornodes and analyzing the traffic in an effort to identify the problem.This process can be slow, resulting in further downtime, and oftencomplicates the troubleshooting process for network operators.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to describe the manner in which the above-recited and otheradvantages and features of the disclosure can be obtained, a moreparticular description of the principles briefly described above will berendered by reference to specific embodiments thereof which areillustrated in the appended drawings. Understanding that these drawingsdepict only exemplary embodiments of the disclosure and are nottherefore to be considered to be limiting of its scope, the principlesherein are described and explained with additional specificity anddetail through the use of the accompanying drawings in which:

FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrate example network environments;

FIG. 2A illustrates an example object model for a network;

FIG. 2B illustrates an example object model for a tenant object in theexample object model from FIG. 2A;

FIG. 2C illustrates an example association of various objects in theexample object model from FIG. 2A;

FIG. 2D illustrates a schematic diagram of example models forimplementing the example object model from FIG. 2A;

FIG. 3A illustrates an example assurance appliance system;

FIG. 3B illustrates an example system diagram for network assurance;

FIG. 4 illustrates an example diagram for constructing device-specificlogical networks based on a logical model of a network;

FIG. 5A illustrates a schematic diagram of an example policy analyzer;

FIG. 5B illustrates an equivalency diagram for different network models;

FIG. 5C illustrates an example architecture for identifying conflictrules;

FIG. 6A illustrates a first example conflict Reduced Ordered BinaryDecision Diagram (ROBDD);

FIG. 6B illustrates a second example conflict ROBDD;

FIG. 6C illustrates the example conflict ROBDD of FIG. 6B with an addedrule;

FIG. 7A illustrates an example method for network assurance;

FIG. 7B illustrates an example method for assurance ofquality-of-service configurations in a network;

FIG. 8 illustrates an example network device; and

FIG. 9 illustrates an example computing device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Various embodiments of the disclosure are discussed in detail below.While specific implementations are discussed, it should be understoodthat this is done for illustration purposes only. A person skilled inthe relevant art will recognize that other components and configurationsmay be used without parting from the spirit and scope of the disclosure.Thus, the following description and drawings are illustrative and arenot to be construed as limiting. Numerous specific details are describedto provide a thorough understanding of the disclosure. However, incertain instances, well-known or conventional details are not describedin order to avoid obscuring the description. References to one or anembodiment in the present disclosure can be references to the sameembodiment or any embodiment; and, such references mean at least one ofthe embodiments.

Reference to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particularfeature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with theembodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the disclosure. Theappearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in thespecification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment,nor are separate or alternative embodiments mutually exclusive of otherembodiments. Moreover, various features are described which may beexhibited by some embodiments and not by others.

The terms used in this specification generally have their ordinarymeanings in the art, within the context of the disclosure, and in thespecific context where each term is used. Alternative language andsynonyms may be used for any one or more of the terms discussed herein,and no special significance should be placed upon whether or not a termis elaborated or discussed herein. In some cases, synonyms for certainterms are provided. A recital of one or more synonyms does not excludethe use of other synonyms. The use of examples anywhere in thisspecification including examples of any terms discussed herein isillustrative only, and is not intended to further limit the scope andmeaning of the disclosure or of any example term. Likewise, thedisclosure is not limited to various embodiments given in thisspecification.

Without intent to limit the scope of the disclosure, examples ofinstruments, apparatus, methods and their related results according tothe embodiments of the present disclosure are given below. Note thattitles or subtitles may be used in the examples for convenience of areader, which in no way should limit the scope of the disclosure. Unlessotherwise defined, technical and scientific terms used herein have themeaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art towhich this disclosure pertains. In the case of conflict, the presentdocument, including definitions will control.

Additional features and advantages of the disclosure will be set forthin the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from thedescription, or can be learned by practice of the herein disclosedprinciples. The features and advantages of the disclosure can berealized and obtained by means of the instruments and combinationsparticularly pointed out in the appended claims. These and otherfeatures of the disclosure will become more fully apparent from thefollowing description and appended claims, or can be learned by thepractice of the principles set forth herein.

Overview

Software-defined networks (SDNs), such as application-centricinfrastructure (ACI) networks, can be managed and configured from one ormore centralized network elements, such as application policyinfrastructure controllers (APICs) in an ACI network or network managersin other SDN networks. A network operator can define variousconfigurations, objects, rules, etc., for the SDN network, which can beimplemented by the one or more centralized network elements. Theconfiguration information provided by the network operator can reflectthe network operator's intent for the SDN network, meaning, how thenetwork operator intends for the SDN network and its components tooperate. Such user intents can be programmatically encapsulated inlogical models stored at the centralized network elements. The logicalmodels can represent the user intents and reflect the configuration ofthe SDN network. For example, the logical models can represent theobject and policy universe (e.g., endpoints, tenants, endpoint groups,networks or contexts, application profiles, services, domains, policies,etc.) as defined for the particular SDN network by the user intentsand/or centralized network elements.

In many cases, various nodes and/or controllers in a network may containrespective information or representations of the network and networkstate. For example, different controllers may store different logicalmodels of the network and each node in the fabric of the network maycontain its own configuration model for the network. The approaches setforth herein enable assurance that QoS contracts or policies have beencorrectly configured as rules in the device's memory, such as a switch'sTCAM memory. Since controllers and switch software use sophisticatedoptimizations for creating switch TCAM rules, the rules corresponding tothe contracts may not have a simple one-to-one mapping with theconfigured contracts. The approaches set forth herein can solve thisproblem and enable assurance irrespective of any optimizations used bythe device's hardware or software. For example, the approaches hereincan identify inconsistencies due to operator errors and incorrectrendering of QoS policies by a network controller, such as an SDNcontroller, in various customer scenarios.

Disclosed herein are systems, methods, and computer-readable media forpolicy assurance of QoS configurations in networks. In some examples, asystem or method can obtain a logical model of a software-definednetwork (SDN). The logical model can represent a configuration ofobjects in a schema associated with the SDN. The configuration ofobjects can include rules specified for the SDN network. The schema candefine manageable objects and object properties for the SDN.

The system or method can also obtain, for each node in the SDN, arespective hardware model including rules rendered or stored at thenode. The rules can be based on a respective node-specificrepresentation of the logical model. In some cases, the rules renderedor stored at the node can be based on rules in contracts specified inthe logical model. The contracts and rules can define, for example, QoSpolicies, security policies, traffic rules, etc.

Based on the logical model and the respective hardware model associatedwith the node, the system or method can perform an equivalency checkbetween the rules in the logical model and the rules in the respectivehardware model, to determine whether the logical model and therespective hardware model contain configuration inconsistencies. In somecases, the equivalency check can be performed by comparing respectivedata structures generated for, and/or representing values associatedwith, the rules in the logical model and the respective hardware model.The respective data structures can include, for example, bit vectors,reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs), n-bitrepresentations, etc.

Example Embodiments

The disclosed technology addresses the need in the art for accurate andefficient QoS assurance. The present technology involves system,methods, and computer-readable media for assurance of QoS configurationsin networks. The present technology will be described in the followingdisclosure as follows. The discussion begins with an introductorydiscussion of network assurance and a description of example computingenvironments, as illustrated in FIGS. 1A and 1B. A discussion of networkmodels for network assurance, as shown in FIGS. 2A through 2D, andnetwork modeling and assurance systems, as shown in FIGS. 3A-C, 4, 5A-C,6A-C, and 7A-B will then follow. The discussion concludes with adescription of example network and computing devices, as illustrated inFIGS. 8 and 9, including example hardware components suitable forhosting software applications and performing computing operations.

The disclosure now turns to a discussion of network assurance.

Network assurance is the guarantee or determination that the network isbehaving as intended by the network operator and has been configuredproperly (e.g., the network is doing what it is intended to do). Intentcan encompass various network operations, such as bridging, routing,security, service chaining, endpoints, compliance, QoS (Quality ofService), audits, etc. Intent can be embodied in one or more policies,settings, configurations, etc., defined for the network and individualnetwork elements (e.g., switches, routers, applications, resources,etc.). In some cases, the configurations, policies, etc., defined by anetwork operator may not be accurately reflected in the actual behaviorof the network. For example, a network operator specifies aconfiguration A for one or more types of traffic but later finds outthat the network is actually applying configuration B to that traffic orotherwise processing that traffic in a manner that is inconsistent withconfiguration A. This can be a result of many different causes, such ashardware errors, software bugs, varying priorities, configurationconflicts, misconfiguration of one or more settings, improper rulerendering by devices, unexpected errors or events, software upgrades,configuration changes, failures, etc. As another example, a networkoperator defines configuration C for the network, but one or moreconfigurations in the network cause the network to behave in a mannerthat is inconsistent with the intent reflected by the network operator'simplementation of configuration C.

The approaches herein can provide network assurance by modeling variousaspects of the network and/or performing consistency checks as well asother network assurance checks. The network assurance approaches hereincan be implemented in various types of networks, including a privatenetwork, such as a local area network (LAN); an enterprise network; astandalone or traditional network, such as a data center network; anetwork including a physical or underlay layer and a logical or overlaylayer, such as a VXLAN or software-defined network (SDN) (e.g.,Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) or VMware NSX networks); etc.

Network models can be constructed for a network and implemented fornetwork assurance. A network model can provide a representation of oneor more aspects of a network, including, without limitation thenetwork's policies, configurations, requirements, security, routing,topology, applications, hardware, filters, contracts, access controllists, infrastructure, etc. For example, a network model can provide amathematical representation of configurations in the network. As will befurther explained below, different types of models can be generated fora network.

Such models can be implemented to ensure that the behavior of thenetwork will be consistent (or is consistent) with the intended behaviorreflected through specific configurations (e.g., policies, settings,definitions, etc.) implemented by the network operator. Unliketraditional network monitoring, which involves sending and analyzingdata packets and observing network behavior, network assurance can beperformed through modeling without necessarily ingesting packet data ormonitoring traffic or network behavior. This can result in foresight,insight, and hindsight: problems can be prevented before they occur,identified when they occur, and fixed immediately after they occur.

Thus, network assurance can involve modeling properties of the networkto deterministically predict the behavior of the network. The networkcan be determined to be healthy if the model(s) indicate proper behavior(e.g., no inconsistencies, conflicts, errors, etc.). The network can bedetermined to be functional, but not fully healthy, if the modelingindicates proper behavior but some inconsistencies. The network can bedetermined to be non-functional and not healthy if the modelingindicates improper behavior and errors. If inconsistencies or errors aredetected by the modeling, a detailed analysis of the correspondingmodel(s) can allow one or more underlying or root problems to beidentified with great accuracy.

The modeling can consume numerous types of smart events which model alarge amount of behavioral aspects of the network. Smart events canimpact various aspects of the network, such as underlay services,overlay services, tenant connectivity, tenant security, tenant end point(EP) mobility, tenant policy, tenant routing, resources, etc.

Having described various aspects of network assurance, the disclosurenow turns to a discussion of example network environments for networkassurance.

FIG. 1A illustrates a diagram of an example Network Environment 100,such as a data center. The Network Environment 100 can include a Fabric120 which can represent the physical layer or infrastructure (e.g.,underlay) of the Network Environment 100. Fabric 120 can include Spines102 (e.g., spine routers or switches) and Leafs 104 (e.g., leaf routersor switches) which can be interconnected for routing or switchingtraffic in the Fabric 120. Spines 102 can interconnect Leafs 104 in theFabric 120, and Leafs 104 can connect the Fabric 120 to an overlay orlogical portion of the Network Environment 100, which can includeapplication services, servers, virtual machines, containers, endpoints,etc. Thus, network connectivity in the Fabric 120 can flow from Spines102 to Leafs 104, and vice versa. The interconnections between Leafs 104and Spines 102 can be redundant (e.g., multiple interconnections) toavoid a failure in routing. In some embodiments, Leafs 104 and Spines102 can be fully connected, such that any given Leaf is connected toeach of the Spines 102, and any given Spine is connected to each of theLeafs 104. Leafs 104 can be, for example, top-of-rack (“ToR”) switches,aggregation switches, gateways, ingress and/or egress switches, provideredge devices, and/or any other type of routing or switching device.

Leafs 104 can be responsible for routing and/or bridging tenant orcustomer packets and applying network policies or rules. Networkpolicies and rules can be driven by one or more Controllers 116, and/orimplemented or enforced by one or more devices, such as Leafs 104. Leafs104 can connect other elements to the Fabric 120. For example, Leafs 104can connect Servers 106, Hypervisors 108, Virtual Machines (VMs) 110,Applications 112, Network Device 114, etc., with Fabric 120. Suchelements can reside in one or more logical or virtual layers ornetworks, such as an overlay network. In some cases, Leafs 104 canencapsulate and decapsulate packets to and from such elements (e.g.,Servers 106) in order to enable communications throughout NetworkEnvironment 100 and Fabric 120. Leafs 104 can also provide any otherdevices, services, tenants, or workloads with access to Fabric 120. Insome cases, Servers 106 connected to Leafs 104 can similarly encapsulateand decapsulate packets to and from Leafs 104. For example, Servers 106can include one or more virtual switches or routers or tunnel endpointsfor tunneling packets between an overlay or logical layer hosted by, orconnected to, Servers 106 and an underlay layer represented by Fabric120 and accessed via Leafs 104.

Applications 112 can include software applications, services,containers, appliances, functions, service chains, etc. For example,Applications 112 can include a firewall, a database, a CDN server, anIDS/IPS, a deep packet inspection service, a message router, a virtualswitch, etc. An application from Applications 112 can be distributed,chained, or hosted by multiple endpoints (e.g., Servers 106, VMs 110,etc.), or may run or execute entirely from a single endpoint.

VMs 110 can be virtual machines hosted by Hypervisors 108 or virtualmachine managers running on Servers 106. VMs 110 can include workloadsrunning on a guest operating system on a respective server. Hypervisors108 can provide a layer of software, firmware, and/or hardware thatcreates, manages, and/or runs the VMs 110. Hypervisors 108 can allow VMs110 to share hardware resources on Servers 106, and the hardwareresources on Servers 106 to appear as multiple, separate hardwareplatforms. Moreover, Hypervisors 108 on Servers 106 can host one or moreVMs 110.

In some cases, VMs 110 and/or Hypervisors 108 can be migrated to otherServers 106. Servers 106 can similarly be migrated to other locations inNetwork Environment 100. For example, a server connected to a specificleaf can be changed to connect to a different or additional leaf. Suchconfiguration or deployment changes can involve modifications tosettings, configurations and policies that are applied to the resourcesbeing migrated as well as other network components.

In some cases, one or more Servers 106, Hypervisors 108, and/or VMs 110can represent or reside in a tenant or customer space. Tenant space caninclude workloads, services, applications, devices, networks, and/orresources that are associated with one or more clients or subscribers.Accordingly, traffic in Network Environment 100 can be routed based onspecific tenant policies, spaces, agreements, configurations, etc.Moreover, addressing can vary between one or more tenants. In someconfigurations, tenant spaces can be divided into logical segmentsand/or networks and separated from logical segments and/or networksassociated with other tenants. Addressing, policy, security andconfiguration information between tenants can be managed by Controllers116, Servers 106, Leafs 104, etc.

Configurations in Network Environment 100 can be implemented at alogical level, a hardware level (e.g., physical), and/or both. Forexample, configurations can be implemented at a logical and/or hardwarelevel based on endpoint or resource attributes, such as endpoint typesand/or application groups or profiles, through a software-definednetwork (SDN) framework (e.g., Application-Centric Infrastructure (ACI)or VMWARE NSX). To illustrate, one or more administrators can defineconfigurations at a logical level (e.g., application or software level)through Controllers 116, which can implement or propagate suchconfigurations through Network Environment 100. In some examples,Controllers 116 can be Application Policy Infrastructure Controllers(APICs) in an ACI framework. In other examples, Controllers 116 can beone or more management components for associated with other SDNsolutions, such as NSX Managers.

Such configurations can define rules, policies, priorities, protocols,attributes, objects, etc., for routing and/or classifying traffic inNetwork Environment 100. For example, such configurations can defineattributes and objects for classifying and processing traffic based onEndpoint Groups (EPGs), Security Groups (SGs), VM types, bridge domains(BDs), virtual routing and forwarding instances (VRFs), tenants,priorities, firewall rules, etc. Other example network objects andconfigurations are further described below. Traffic policies and rulescan be enforced based on tags, attributes, or other characteristics ofthe traffic, such as protocols associated with the traffic, EPGsassociated with the traffic, SGs associated with the traffic, networkaddress information associated with the traffic, etc. Such policies andrules can be enforced by one or more elements in Network Environment100, such as Leafs 104, Servers 106, Hypervisors 108, Controllers 116,etc. As previously explained, Network Environment 100 can be configuredaccording to one or more particular software-defined network (SDN)solutions, such as CISCO ACI or VMWARE NSX. These example SDN solutionsare briefly described below.

ACI can provide an application-centric or policy-based solution throughscalable distributed enforcement. ACI supports integration of physicaland virtual environments under a declarative configuration model fornetworks, servers, services, security, requirements, etc. For example,the ACI framework implements EPGs, which can include a collection ofendpoints or applications that share common configuration requirements,such as security, QoS, services, etc. Endpoints can be virtual/logicalor physical devices, such as VMs, containers, hosts, or physical serversthat are connected to Network Environment 100. Endpoints can have one ormore attributes such as a VM name, guest OS name, a security tag,application profile, etc. Application configurations can be appliedbetween EPGs, instead of endpoints directly, in the form of contracts.Leafs 104 can classify incoming traffic into different EPGs. Theclassification can be based on, for example, a network segmentidentifier such as a VLAN ID, VXLAN Network Identifier (VNID), NVGREVirtual Subnet Identifier (VSID), MAC address, IP address, etc.

In some cases, classification in the ACI infrastructure can beimplemented by Application Virtual Switches (AVS), which can run on ahost, such as a server or switch. For example, an AVS can classifytraffic based on specified attributes, and tag packets of differentattribute EPGs with different identifiers, such as network segmentidentifiers (e.g., VLAN ID). Finally, Leafs 104 can tie packets withtheir attribute EPGs based on their identifiers and enforce policies,which can be implemented and/or managed by one or more Controllers 116.Leaf 104 can classify to which EPG the traffic from a host belongs andenforce policies accordingly.

Another example SDN solution is based on VMWARE NSX. With VMWARE NSX,hosts can run a distributed firewall (DFW) which can classify andprocess traffic. Consider a case where three types of VMs, namely,application, database and web VMs, are put into a single layer-2 networksegment. Traffic protection can be provided within the network segmentbased on the VM type. For example, HTTP traffic can be allowed among webVMs, and disallowed between a web VM and an application or database VM.To classify traffic and implement policies, VMWARE NSX can implementsecurity groups, which can be used to group the specific VMs (e.g., webVMs, application VMs, database VMs). DFW rules can be configured toimplement policies for the specific security groups. To illustrate, inthe context of the previous example, DFW rules can be configured toblock HTTP traffic between web, application, and database securitygroups.

Returning now to FIG. 1A, Network Environment 100 can deploy differenthosts via Leafs 104, Servers 106, Hypervisors 108, VMs 110, Applications112, and Controllers 116, such as VMWARE ESXi hosts, WINDOWS HYPER-Vhosts, bare metal physical hosts, etc. Network Environment 100 mayinteroperate with a variety of Hypervisors 108, Servers 106 (e.g.,physical and/or virtual servers), SDN orchestration platforms, etc.Network Environment 100 may implement a declarative model to allow itsintegration with application design and holistic network policy.

Controllers 116 can provide centralized access to fabric information,application configuration, resource configuration, application-levelconfiguration modeling for a software-defined network (SDN)infrastructure, integration with management systems or servers, etc.Controllers 116 can form a control plane that interfaces with anapplication plane via northbound APIs and a data plane via southboundAPIs.

As previously noted, Controllers 116 can define and manageapplication-level model(s) for configurations in Network Environment100. In some cases, application or device configurations can also bemanaged and/or defined by other components in the network. For example,a hypervisor or virtual appliance, such as a VM or container, can run aserver or management tool to manage software and services in NetworkEnvironment 100, including configurations and settings for virtualappliances.

As illustrated above, Network Environment 100 can include one or moredifferent types of SDN solutions, hosts, etc. For the sake of clarityand explanation purposes, various examples in the disclosure will bedescribed with reference to an ACI framework, and Controllers 116 may beinterchangeably referenced as controllers, APICs, or APIC controllers.However, it should be noted that the technologies and concepts hereinare not limited to ACI solutions and may be implemented in otherarchitectures and scenarios, including other SDN solutions as well asother types of networks which may not deploy an SDN solution.

Further, as referenced herein, the term “hosts” can refer to Servers 106(e.g., physical or logical), Hypervisors 108, VMs 110, containers (e.g.,Applications 112), etc., and can run or include any type of server orapplication solution. Non-limiting examples of “hosts” can includevirtual switches or routers, such as distributed virtual switches (DVS),application virtual switches (AVS), vector packet processing (VPP)switches; VCENTER and NSX MANAGERS; bare metal physical hosts; HYPER-Vhosts; VMs; DOCKER Containers; etc.

FIG. 1B illustrates another example of Network Environment 100. In thisexample, Network Environment 100 includes Endpoints 122 connected toLeafs 104 in Fabric 120. Endpoints 122 can be physical and/or logical orvirtual entities, such as servers, clients, VMs, hypervisors, softwarecontainers, applications, resources, network devices, workloads, etc.For example, an Endpoint 122 can be an object that represents a physicaldevice (e.g., server, client, switch, etc.), an application (e.g., webapplication, database application, etc.), a logical or virtual resource(e.g., a virtual switch, a virtual service appliance, a virtualizednetwork function (VNF), a VM, a service chain, etc.), a containerrunning a software resource (e.g., an application, an appliance, a VNF,a service chain, etc.), storage, a workload or workload engine, etc.Endpoints 122 can have an address (e.g., an identity), a location (e.g.,host, network segment, virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) instance,domain, etc.), one or more attributes (e.g., name, type, version, patchlevel, OS name, OS type, etc.), a tag (e.g., security tag), a profile,etc.

Endpoints 122 can be associated with respective Logical Groups 118.Logical Groups 118 can be logical entities containing endpoints(physical and/or logical or virtual) grouped together according to oneor more attributes, such as endpoint type (e.g., VM type, workload type,application type, etc.), one or more requirements (e.g., policyrequirements, security requirements, QoS requirements, customerrequirements, resource requirements, etc.), a resource name (e.g., VMname, application name, etc.), a profile, platform or operating system(OS) characteristics (e.g., OS type or name including guest and/or hostOS, etc.), an associated network or tenant, one or more policies, a tag,etc. For example, a logical group can be an object representing acollection of endpoints grouped together. To illustrate, Logical Group 1can contain client endpoints, Logical Group 2 can contain web serverendpoints, Logical Group 3 can contain application server endpoints,Logical Group N can contain database server endpoints, etc. In someexamples, Logical Groups 118 are EPGs in an ACI environment and/or otherlogical groups (e.g., SGs) in another SDN environment.

Traffic to and/or from Endpoints 122 can be classified, processed,managed, etc., based Logical Groups 118. For example, Logical Groups 118can be used to classify traffic to or from Endpoints 122, apply policiesto traffic to or from Endpoints 122, define relationships betweenEndpoints 122, define roles of Endpoints 122 (e.g., whether an endpointconsumes or provides a service, etc.), apply rules to traffic to or fromEndpoints 122, apply filters or access control lists (ACLs) to trafficto or from Endpoints 122, define communication paths for traffic to orfrom Endpoints 122, enforce requirements associated with Endpoints 122,implement security and other configurations associated with Endpoints122, etc.

In an ACI environment, Logical Groups 118 can be EPGs used to definecontracts in the ACI. Contracts can include rules specifying what andhow communications between EPGs take place. For example, a contract candefine what provides a service, what consumes a service, and what policyobjects are related to that consumption relationship. A contract caninclude a policy that defines the communication path and all relatedelements of a communication or relationship between endpoints or EPGs.For example, a Web EPG can provide a service that a Client EPG consumes,and that consumption can be subject to a filter (ACL) and a servicegraph that includes one or more services, such as firewall inspectionservices and server load balancing.

FIG. 2A illustrates a diagram of an example schema of an SDN network,such as Network Environment 100. The schema can define objects,properties, and relationships associated with the SDN network. In thisexample, the schema is a Management Information Model 200 as furtherdescribed below. However, in other configurations and implementations,the schema can be a different model or specification associated with adifferent type of network.

The following discussion of Management Information Model 200 referencesvarious terms which shall also be used throughout the disclosure.Accordingly, for clarity, the disclosure shall first provide below alist of terminology, which will be followed by a more detaileddiscussion of Management Information Model 200.

As used herein, an “Alias” can refer to a changeable name for a givenobject. Even if the name of an object, once created, cannot be changed,the Alias can be a field that can be changed. The term “Aliasing” canrefer to a rule (e.g., contracts, policies, configurations, etc.) thatoverlaps one or more other rules. For example, Contract 1 defined in alogical model of a network can be said to be aliasing Contract 2 definedin the logical model of the network if Contract 1 completely overlapsContract 2. In this example, by aliasing Contract 2, Contract 1 rendersContract 2 redundant or inoperable. For example, if Contract 1 has ahigher priority than Contract 2, such aliasing can render Contract 2redundant based on Contract 1's overlapping and higher prioritycharacteristics.

As used herein, the term “APIC” can refer to one or more controllers(e.g., Controllers 116) in an ACI framework. The APIC can provide aunified point of automation and management, policy programming,application deployment, health monitoring for an ACI multitenant fabric.The APIC can be implemented as a single controller, a distributedcontroller, or a replicated, synchronized, and/or clustered controller.

As used herein, the term “BDD” can refer to a binary decision tree. Abinary decision tree can be a data structure representing functions,such as Boolean functions.

As used herein, the term “BD” can refer to a bridge domain. A bridgedomain can be a set of logical ports that share the same flooding orbroadcast characteristics. Like a virtual LAN (VLAN), bridge domains canspan multiple devices. A bridge domain can be a L2 (Layer 2) construct.

As used herein, a “Consumer” can refer to an endpoint, resource, and/orEPG that consumes a service.

As used herein, a “Context” can refer to an L3 (Layer 3) address domainthat allows multiple instances of a routing table to exist and worksimultaneously. This increases functionality by allowing network pathsto be segmented without using multiple devices. Non-limiting examples ofa context or L3 address domain can include a Virtual Routing andForwarding (VRF) instance, a private network, and so forth.

As used herein, the term “Contract” can refer to rules or configurationsthat specify what and how communications in a network are conducted(e.g., allowed, denied, filtered, processed, etc.). In an ACI network,contracts can specify how communications between endpoints and/or EPGstake place. In some examples, a contract can provide rules andconfigurations akin to an Access Control List (ACL).

As used herein, the term “Distinguished Name” (DN) can refer to a uniquename that describes an object, such as an MO, and locates its place inManagement Information Model 200. In some cases, the DN can be (orequate to) a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).

As used herein, the term “Endpoint Group” (EPG) can refer to a logicalentity or object associated with a collection or group of endpoints aspreviously described with reference to FIG. 1B.

As used herein, the term “Filter” can refer to a parameter orconfiguration for allowing communications. For example, in a whitelistmodel where all communications are blocked by default, a communicationmust be given explicit permission to prevent such communication frombeing blocked. A filter can define permission(s) for one or morecommunications or packets. A filter can thus function similar to an ACLor Firewall rule. In some examples, a filter can be implemented in apacket (e.g., TCP/IP) header field, such as L3 protocol type, L4 (Layer4) ports, and so on, which is used to allow inbound or outboundcommunications between endpoints or EPGs, for example.

As used herein, the term “L2 Out” can refer to a bridged connection. Abridged connection can connect two or more segments of the same networkso that they can communicate. In an ACI framework, an L2 out can be abridged (Layer 2) connection between an ACI fabric (e.g., Fabric 120)and an outside Layer 2 network, such as a switch.

As used herein, the term “L3 Out” can refer to a routed connection. Arouted Layer 3 connection uses a set of protocols that determine thepath that data follows in order to travel across networks from itssource to its destination. Routed connections can perform forwarding(e.g., IP forwarding) according to a protocol selected, such as BGP(border gateway protocol), OSPF (Open Shortest Path First), EIGRP(Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol), etc.

As used herein, the term “Managed Object” (MO) can refer to an abstractrepresentation of objects that are managed in a network (e.g., NetworkEnvironment 100). The objects can be concrete objects (e.g., a switch,server, adapter, etc.), or logical objects (e.g., an applicationprofile, an EPG, a fault, etc.). The MOs can be network resources orelements that are managed in the network. For example, in an ACIenvironment, an MO can include an abstraction of an ACI fabric (e.g.,Fabric 120) resource.

As used herein, the term “Management Information Tree” (MIT) can referto a hierarchical management information tree containing the MOs of asystem. For example, in ACI, the MIT contains the MOs of the ACI fabric(e.g., Fabric 120). The MIT can also be referred to as a ManagementInformation Model (MIM), such as Management Information Model 200.

As used herein, the term “Policy” can refer to one or morespecifications for controlling some aspect of system or networkbehavior. For example, a policy can include a named entity that containsspecifications for controlling some aspect of system behavior. Toillustrate, a Layer 3 Outside Network Policy can contain the BGPprotocol to enable BGP routing functions when connecting Fabric 120 toan outside Layer 3 network.

As used herein, the term “Profile” can refer to the configurationdetails associated with a policy. For example, a profile can include anamed entity that contains the configuration details for implementingone or more instances of a policy. To illustrate, a switch node profilefor a routing policy can contain the switch-specific configurationdetails to implement the BGP routing protocol.

As used herein, the term “Provider” refers to an object or entityproviding a service. For example, a provider can be an EPG that providesa service.

As used herein, the term “Subject” refers to one or more parameters in acontract for defining communications. For example, in ACI, subjects in acontract can specify what information can be communicated and how.Subjects can function similar to ACLs.

As used herein, the term “Tenant” refers to a unit of isolation in anetwork. For example, a tenant can be a secure and exclusive virtualcomputing environment. In ACI, a tenant can be a unit of isolation froma policy perspective, but does not necessarily represent a privatenetwork. Indeed, ACI tenants can contain multiple private networks(e.g., VRFs). Tenants can represent a customer in a service providersetting, an organization or domain in an enterprise setting, or just agrouping of policies.

As used herein, the term “VRF” refers to a virtual routing andforwarding instance. The VRF can define a Layer 3 address domain thatallows multiple instances of a routing table to exist and worksimultaneously. This increases functionality by allowing network pathsto be segmented without using multiple devices. Also known as a contextor private network.

Having described various terms used herein, the disclosure now returnsto a discussion of Management Information Model (MIM) 200 in FIG. 2A. Aspreviously noted, MIM 200 can be a hierarchical management informationtree or MIT. Moreover, MIM 200 can be managed and processed byControllers 116, such as APICs in an ACI. Controllers 116 can enable thecontrol of managed resources by presenting their manageablecharacteristics as object properties that can be inherited according tothe location of the object within the hierarchical structure of themodel.

The hierarchical structure of MIM 200 starts with Policy Universe 202 atthe top (Root) and contains parent and child nodes 116, 204, 206, 208,210, 212. Nodes 116, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212 in the tree representthe managed objects (MOs) or groups of objects. Each object in thefabric (e.g., Fabric 120) has a unique distinguished name (DN) thatdescribes the object and locates its place in the tree. The Nodes 116,202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212 can include the various MOs, as describedbelow, which contain policies that govern the operation of the system.

Controllers 116

Controllers 116 (e.g., APIC controllers) can provide management, policyprogramming, application deployment, and health monitoring for Fabric120.

Node 204

Node 204 includes a tenant container for policies that enable anadministrator to exercise domain-based access control. Non-limitingexamples of tenants can include:

User tenants defined by the administrator according to the needs ofusers. They contain policies that govern the operation of resources suchas applications, databases, web servers, network-attached storage,virtual machines, and so on.

The common tenant is provided by the system but can be configured by theadministrator. It contains policies that govern the operation ofresources accessible to all tenants, such as firewalls, load balancers,Layer 4 to Layer 7 services, intrusion detection appliances, and so on.

The infrastructure tenant is provided by the system but can beconfigured by the administrator. It contains policies that govern theoperation of infrastructure resources such as the fabric overlay (e.g.,VXLAN). It also enables a fabric provider to selectively deployresources to one or more user tenants. Infrastructure tenant polices canbe configurable by the administrator.

The management tenant is provided by the system but can be configured bythe administrator. It contains policies that govern the operation offabric management functions used for in-band and out-of-bandconfiguration of fabric nodes. The management tenant contains a privateout-of-bound address space for the Controller/Fabric internalcommunications that is outside the fabric data path that provides accessthrough the management port of the switches. The management tenantenables discovery and automation of communications with virtual machinecontrollers.

Node 206

Node 206 can contain access policies that govern the operation of switchaccess ports that provide connectivity to resources such as storage,compute, Layer 2 and Layer 3 (bridged and routed) connectivity, virtualmachine hypervisors, Layer 4 to Layer 7 devices, and so on. If a tenantrequires interface configurations other than those provided in thedefault link, Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP), Link Layer DiscoveryProtocol (LLDP), Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP), or SpanningTree Protocol (STP), an administrator can configure access policies toenable such configurations on the access ports of Leafs 104.

Node 206 can contain fabric policies that govern the operation of theswitch fabric ports, including such functions as Network Time Protocol(NTP) server synchronization, Intermediate System-to-Intermediate SystemProtocol (IS-IS), Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route reflectors, DomainName System (DNS) and so on. The fabric MO contains objects such aspower supplies, fans, chassis, and so on.

Node 208

Node 208 can contain VM domains that group VM controllers with similarnetworking policy requirements. VM controllers can share virtual space(e.g., VLAN or VXLAN space) and application EPGs. Controllers 116communicate with the VM controller to publish network configurationssuch as port groups that are then applied to the virtual workloads.

Node 210

Node 210 can contain Layer 4 to Layer 7 service integration life cycleautomation framework that enables the system to dynamically respond whena service comes online or goes offline. Policies can provide servicedevice package and inventory management functions.

Node 212

Node 212 can contain access, authentication, and accounting (AAA)policies that govern user privileges, roles, and security domains ofFabric 120.

The hierarchical policy model can fit well with an API, such as a RESTAPI interface. When invoked, the API can read from or write to objectsin the MIT. URLs can map directly into distinguished names that identifyobjects in the MIT. Data in the MIT can be described as a self-containedstructured tree text document encoded in XML or JSON, for example.

FIG. 2B illustrates an example object model 220 for a tenant portion ofMIM 200. As previously noted, a tenant is a logical container forapplication policies that enable an administrator to exercisedomain-based access control. A tenant thus represents a unit ofisolation from a policy perspective, but it does not necessarilyrepresent a private network. Tenants can represent a customer in aservice provider setting, an organization or domain in an enterprisesetting, or just a convenient grouping of policies. Moreover, tenantscan be isolated from one another or can share resources.

Tenant portion 204A of MIM 200 can include various entities, and theentities in Tenant Portion 204A can inherit policies from parententities. Non-limiting examples of entities in Tenant Portion 204A caninclude Filters 240, Contracts 236, Outside Networks 222, Bridge Domains230, VRF Instances 234, and Application Profiles 224.

Bridge Domains 230 can include Subnets 232. Contracts 236 can includeSubjects 238. Application Profiles 224 can contain one or more EPGs 226.Some applications can contain multiple components. For example, ane-commerce application could require a web server, a database server,data located in a storage area network, and access to outside resourcesthat enable financial transactions. Application Profile 224 contains asmany (or as few) EPGs as necessary that are logically related toproviding the capabilities of an application.

EPG 226 can be organized in various ways, such as based on theapplication they provide, the function they provide (such asinfrastructure), where they are in the structure of the data center(such as DMZ), or whatever organizing principle that a fabric or tenantadministrator chooses to use.

EPGs in the fabric can contain various types of EPGs, such asapplication EPGs, Layer 2 external outside network instance EPGs, Layer3 external outside network instance EPGs, management EPGs forout-of-band or in-band access, etc. EPGs 226 can also contain Attributes228, such as encapsulation-based EPGs, IP-based EPGs, or MAC-based EPGs.

As previously mentioned, EPGs can contain endpoints (e.g., EPs 122) thathave common characteristics or attributes, such as common policyrequirements (e.g., security, virtual machine mobility (VMM), QoS, orLayer 4 to Layer 7 services). Rather than configure and manage endpointsindividually, they can be placed in an EPG and managed as a group.

Policies apply to EPGs, including the endpoints they contain. An EPG canbe statically configured by an administrator in Controllers 116, ordynamically configured by an automated system such as VCENTER orOPENSTACK.

To activate tenant policies in Tenant Portion 204A, fabric accesspolicies should be configured and associated with tenant policies.Access policies enable an administrator to configure other networkconfigurations, such as port channels and virtual port channels,protocols such as LLDP, CDP, or LACP, and features such as monitoring ordiagnostics.

FIG. 2C illustrates an example Association 260 of tenant entities andaccess entities in MIM 200. Policy Universe 202 contains Tenant Portion204A and Access Portion 206A. Thus, Tenant Portion 204A and AccessPortion 206A are associated through Policy Universe 202.

Access Portion 206A can contain fabric and infrastructure accesspolicies. Typically, in a policy model, EPGs are coupled with VLANs. Fortraffic to flow, an EPG is deployed on a leaf port with a VLAN in aphysical, VMM, L2 out, L3 out, or Fiber Channel domain, for example.

Access Portion 206A thus contains Domain Profile 236 which can define aphysical, VMM, L2 out, L3 out, or Fiber Channel domain, for example, tobe associated to the EPGs. Domain Profile 236 contains VLAN InstanceProfile 238 (e.g., VLAN pool) and Attacheable Access Entity Profile(AEP) 240, which are associated directly with application EPGs. The AEP240 deploys the associated application EPGs to the ports to which it isattached, and automates the task of assigning VLANs. While a large datacenter can have thousands of active VMs provisioned on hundreds ofVLANs, Fabric 120 can automatically assign VLAN IDs from VLAN pools.This saves time compared with trunking down VLANs in a traditional datacenter.

FIG. 2D illustrates a schematic diagram of example models for a network,such as Network Environment 100. The models can be generated based onspecific configurations and/or network state parameters associated withvarious objects, policies, properties, and elements defined in MIM 200.The models can be implemented for network analysis and assurance, andmay provide a depiction of the network at various stages ofimplementation and levels of the network.

As illustrated, the models can include L_Model 270A (Logical Model),LR_Model 270B (Logical Rendered Model or Logical Runtime Model),Li_Model 272 (Logical Model for i), Ci_Model 274 (Concrete model for i),and/or Hi_Model 276 (Hardware model or TCAM Model for i).

L_Model 270A is the logical representation of various elements in MIM200 as configured in a network (e.g., Network Environment 100), such asobjects, object properties, object relationships, and other elements inMIM 200 as configured in a network. L_Model 270A can be generated byControllers 116 based on configurations entered in Controllers 116 forthe network, and thus represents the logical configuration of thenetwork at Controllers 116. This is the declaration of the “end-state”expression that is desired when the elements of the network entities(e.g., applications, tenants, etc.) are connected and Fabric 120 isprovisioned by Controllers 116. Because L_Model 270A represents theconfigurations entered in Controllers 116, including the objects andrelationships in MIM 200, it can also reflect the “intent” of theadministrator: how the administrator wants the network and networkelements to behave.

L_Model 270A can be a fabric or network-wide logical model. For example,L_Model 270A can account configurations and objects from each ofControllers 116. As previously explained, Network Environment 100 caninclude multiple Controllers 116. In some cases, two or more Controllers116 may include different configurations or logical models for thenetwork. In such cases, L_Model 270A can obtain any of theconfigurations or logical models from Controllers 116 and generate afabric or network wide logical model based on the configurations andlogical models from all Controllers 116. L_Model 270A can thusincorporate configurations or logical models between Controllers 116 toprovide a comprehensive logical model. L_Model 270A can also address oraccount for any dependencies, redundancies, conflicts, etc., that mayresult from the configurations or logical models at the differentControllers 116.

LR_Model 270B is the abstract model expression that Controllers 116(e.g., APICs in ACI) resolve from L_Model 270A. LR_Model 270B canprovide the configuration components that would be delivered to thephysical infrastructure (e.g., Fabric 120) to execute one or morepolicies. For example, LR_Model 270B can be delivered to Leafs 104 inFabric 120 to configure Leafs 104 for communication with attachedEndpoints 122. LR_Model 270B can also incorporate state information tocapture a runtime state of the network (e.g., Fabric 120).

In some cases, LR_Model 270B can provide a representation of L_Model270A that is normalized according to a specific format or expressionthat can be propagated to, and/or understood by, the physicalinfrastructure of Fabric 120 (e.g., Leafs 104, Spines 102, etc.). Forexample, LR_Model 270B can associate the elements in L_Model 270A withspecific identifiers or tags that can be interpreted and/or compiled bythe switches in Fabric 120, such as hardware plane identifiers used asclassifiers.

Li_Model 272 is a switch-level or switch-specific model obtained fromL_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B. Li_Model 272 can project L_Model 270Aand/or LR_Model 270B on a specific switch or device i, and thus canconvey how L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B should appear or beimplemented at the specific switch or device i.

For example, Li_Model 272 can project L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270Bpertaining to a specific switch i to capture a switch-levelrepresentation of L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B at switch i. Toillustrate, Li_Model 272 L₁ can represent L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model270B projected to, or implemented at, Leaf 1 (104). Thus, Li_Model 272can be generated from L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B for individualdevices (e.g., Leafs 104, Spines 102, etc.) on Fabric 120.

In some cases, Li_Model 272 can be represented using JSON (JavaScriptObject Notation). For example, Li_Model 272 can include JSON objects,such as Rules, Filters, Entries, and Scopes.

Ci_Model 274 is the actual in-state configuration at the individualfabric member i (e.g., switch i). In other words, Ci_Model 274 is aswitch-level or switch-specific model that is based on Li_Model 272. Forexample, Controllers 116 can deliver Li_Model 272 to Leaf 1 (104). Leaf1 (104) can take Li_Model 272, which can be specific to Leaf 1 (104),and render the policies in Li_Model 272 into a concrete model, Ci_Model274, that runs on Leaf 1 (104). Leaf 1 (104) can render Li_Model 272 viathe OS on Leaf 1 (104), for example. Thus, Ci_Model 274 can be analogousto compiled software, as it is the form of Li_Model 272 that the switchOS at Leaf 1 (104) can execute.

In some cases, Li_Model 272 and Ci_Model 274 can have a same or similarformat. For example, Li_Model 272 and Ci_Model 274 can be based on JSONobjects. Having the same or similar format can facilitate objects inLi_Model 272 and Ci_Model 274 to be compared for equivalence orcongruence. Such equivalence or congruence checks can be used fornetwork analysis and assurance, as further described herein.

Hi_Model 276 is also a switch-level or switch-specific model for switchi, but is based on Ci_Model 274 for switch i. Hi_Model 276 is the actualconfiguration (e.g., rules) stored or rendered on the hardware or memory(e.g., TCAM memory) at the individual fabric member i (e.g., switch i).For example, Hi_Model 276 can represent the configurations (e.g., rules)which Leaf 1 (104) stores or renders on the hardware (e.g., TCAM memory)of Leaf 1 (104) based on Ci_Model 274 at Leaf 1 (104). The switch OS atLeaf 1 (104) can render or execute Ci_Model 274, and Leaf 1 (104) canstore or render the configurations from Ci_Model 274 in storage, such asthe memory or TCAM at Leaf 1 (104). The configurations from Hi_Model 276stored or rendered by Leaf 1 (104) represent the configurations thatwill be implemented by Leaf 1 (104) when processing traffic.

While Models 272, 274, 276 are shown as device-specific models, similarmodels can be generated or aggregated for a collection of fabric members(e.g., Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102) in Fabric 120. When combined,device-specific models, such as Model 272, Model 274, and/or Model 276,can provide a representation of Fabric 120 that extends beyond aparticular device. For example, in some cases, Li_Model 272, Ci_Model274, and/or Hi_Model 276 associated with some or all individual fabricmembers (e.g., Leafs 104 and Spines 102) can be combined or aggregatedto generate one or more aggregated models based on the individual fabricmembers.

As referenced herein, the terms H Model, T Model, and TCAM Model can beused interchangeably to refer to a hardware model, such as Hi_Model 276.For example, Ti Model, Hi Model and TCAMi Model may be usedinterchangeably to refer to Hi_Model 276.

Models 270A, 270B, 272, 274, 276 can provide representations of variousaspects of the network or various configuration stages for MIM 200. Forexample, one or more of Models 270A, 270B, 272, 274, 276 can be used togenerate Underlay Model 278 representing one or more aspects of Fabric120 (e.g., underlay topology, routing, etc.), Overlay Model 280representing one or more aspects of the overlay or logical segment(s) ofNetwork Environment 100 (e.g., COOP, MPBGP, tenants, VRFs, VLANs,VXLANs, virtual applications, VMs, hypervisors, virtual switching,etc.), Tenant Model 282 representing one or more aspects of Tenantportion 204A in MIM 200 (e.g., security, forwarding, service chaining,QoS, VRFs, BDs, Contracts, Filters, EPGs, subnets, etc.), ResourcesModel 284 representing one or more resources in Network Environment 100(e.g., storage, computing, VMs, port channels, physical elements, etc.),etc.

In general, L_Model 270A can be the high-level expression of what existsin the LR_Model 270B, which should be present on the concrete devices asCi_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 expression. If there is any gap betweenthe models, there may be inconsistent configurations or problems.

FIG. 3A illustrates a diagram of an example Assurance Appliance System300 for network assurance. In this example, Assurance Appliance System300 can include k Resources 110 (e.g., VMs) operating in cluster mode.Resources 110 can refer to VMs, software containers, bare metal devices,Endpoints 122, or any other physical or logical systems or components.It should be noted that, while FIG. 3A illustrates a cluster modeconfiguration, other configurations are also contemplated herein, suchas a single mode configuration (e.g., single VM, container, or server)or a service chain for example.

Assurance Appliance System 300 can run on one or more Servers 106,Resources 110, Hypervisors 108, EPs 122, Leafs 104, Controllers 116, orany other system or resource. For example, Assurance Appliance System300 can be a logical service or application running on one or moreResources 110 in Network Environment 100.

The Assurance Appliance System 300 can include Data Framework 308 (e.g.,APACHE APEX, HADOOP, HDFS, ZOOKEEPER, etc.). In some cases, assurancechecks can be written as, or provided by, individual operators thatreside in Data Framework 308. This enables a natively horizontalscale-out architecture that can scale to arbitrary number of switches inFabric 120 (e.g., ACI fabric).

Assurance Appliance System 300 can poll Fabric 120 at a configurableperiodicity (e.g., an epoch). In some examples, the analysis workflowcan be setup as a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) of Operators 310, wheredata flows from one operator to another and eventually results aregenerated and persisted to Database 302 for each interval (e.g., eachepoch).

The north-tier implements API Server (e.g., APACHE TOMCAT, SPRINGframework, etc.) 304 and Web Server 306. A graphical user interface(GUI) interacts via the APIs exposed to the customer. These APIs canalso be used by the customer to collect data from Assurance ApplianceSystem 300 for further integration into other tools.

Operators 310 in Data Framework 308 can together support assuranceoperations. Below are non-limiting examples of assurance operations thatcan be performed by Assurance Appliance System 300 via Operators 310.

Security Policy Adherence

Assurance Appliance System 300 can check to make sure the configurationsor specification from L_Model 270A, which may reflect the user's intentfor the network, including for example the security policies andcustomer-configured contracts, are correctly implemented and/or renderedin Li_Model 272, Ci_Model 274, and Hi_Model 276, and thus properlyimplemented and rendered by the fabric members (e.g., Leafs 104), andreport any errors, contract violations, or irregularities found.

Static Policy Analysis

Assurance Appliance System 300 can check for issues in the specificationof the user's intent or intents (e.g., identify contradictory orconflicting policies in L_Model 270A). Assurance Appliance System 300can identify lint events based on the intent specification of a network.The lint and policy analysis can include semantic and/or syntacticchecks of the intent specification(s) of a network.

TCAM Utilization

TCAM is a scarce resource in the fabric (e.g., Fabric 120). However,Assurance Appliance System 300 can analyze the TCAM utilization by thenetwork data (e.g., Longest Prefix Match (LPM) tables, routing tables,VLAN tables, BGP updates, etc.), Contracts, Logical Groups 118 (e.g.,EPGs), Tenants, Spines 102, Leafs 104, and other dimensions in NetworkEnvironment 100 and/or objects in MIM 200, to provide a network operatoror user visibility into the utilization of this scarce resource. Thiscan greatly help for planning and other optimization purposes.

Endpoint Checks

Assurance Appliance System 300 can validate that the fabric (e.g. fabric120) has no inconsistencies in the Endpoint information registered(e.g., two leafs announcing the same endpoint, duplicate subnets, etc.),among other such checks.

Tenant Routing Checks

Assurance Appliance System 300 can validate that BDs, VRFs, subnets(both internal and external), VLANs, contracts, filters, applications,EPGs, etc., are correctly programmed.

Infrastructure Routing

Assurance Appliance System 300 can validate that infrastructure routing(e.g., IS-IS protocol) has no convergence issues leading to black holes,loops, flaps, and other problems.

MP-BGP Route Reflection Checks

The network fabric (e.g., Fabric 120) can interface with other externalnetworks and provide connectivity to them via one or more protocols,such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF),etc. The learned routes are advertised within the network fabric via,for example, MP-BGP. These checks can ensure that a route reflectionservice via, for example, MP-BGP (e.g., from Border Leaf) does not havehealth issues.

Logical Lint and Real-Time Change Analysis

Assurance Appliance System 300 can validate rules in the specificationof the network (e.g., L_Model 270A) are complete and do not haveinconsistencies or other problems. MOs in the MIM 200 can be checked byAssurance Appliance System 300 through syntactic and semantic checksperformed on L_Model 270A and/or the associated configurations of theMOs in MIM 200. Assurance Appliance System 300 can also verify thatunnecessary, stale, unused or redundant configurations, such ascontracts, are removed.

FIG. 3B illustrates an architectural diagram of an example system 350for network assurance, such as Assurance Appliance System 300. In somecases, system 350 can correspond to the DAG of Operators 310 previouslydiscussed with respect to FIG. 3A

In this example, Topology Explorer 312 communicates with Controllers 116(e.g., APIC controllers) in order to discover or otherwise construct acomprehensive topological view of Fabric 120 (e.g., Spines 102, Leafs104, Controllers 116, Endpoints 122, and any other components as well astheir interconnections). While various architectural components arerepresented in a singular, boxed fashion, it is understood that a givenarchitectural component, such as Topology Explorer 312, can correspondto one or more individual Operators 310 and may include one or morenodes or endpoints, such as one or more servers, VMs, containers,applications, service functions (e.g., functions in a service chain orvirtualized network function), etc.

Topology Explorer 312 is configured to discover nodes in Fabric 120,such as Controllers 116, Leafs 104, Spines 102, etc. Topology Explorer312 can additionally detect a majority election performed amongstControllers 116, and determine whether a quorum exists amongstControllers 116. If no quorum or majority exists, Topology Explorer 312can trigger an event and alert a user that a configuration or othererror exists amongst Controllers 116 that is preventing a quorum ormajority from being reached. Topology Explorer 312 can detect Leafs 104and Spines 102 that are part of Fabric 120 and publish theircorresponding out-of-band management network addresses (e.g., IPaddresses) to downstream services. This can be part of the topologicalview that is published to the downstream services at the conclusion ofTopology Explorer's 312 discovery epoch (e.g., 5 minutes, or some otherspecified interval).

In some examples, Topology Explorer 312 can receive as input a list ofControllers 116 (e.g., APIC controllers) that are associated with thenetwork/fabric (e.g., Fabric 120). Topology Explorer 312 can alsoreceive corresponding credentials to login to each controller. TopologyExplorer 312 can retrieve information from each controller using, forexample, REST calls. Topology Explorer 312 can obtain from eachcontroller a list of nodes (e.g., Leafs 104 and Spines 102), and theirassociated properties, that the controller is aware of. TopologyExplorer 312 can obtain node information from Controllers 116 including,without limitation, an IP address, a node identifier, a node name, anode domain, a node URI, a node_dm, a node role, a node version, etc.

Topology Explorer 312 can also determine if Controllers 116 are inquorum, or are sufficiently communicatively coupled amongst themselves.For example, if there are n controllers, a quorum condition might be metwhen (n/2+1) controllers are aware of each other and/or arecommunicatively coupled. Topology Explorer 312 can make thedetermination of a quorum (or identify any failed nodes or controllers)by parsing the data returned from the controllers, and identifyingcommunicative couplings between their constituent nodes. TopologyExplorer 312 can identify the type of each node in the network, e.g.spine, leaf, APIC, etc., and include this information in the topologyinformation generated (e.g., topology map or model).

If no quorum is present, Topology Explorer 312 can trigger an event andalert a user that reconfiguration or suitable attention is required. Ifa quorum is present, Topology Explorer 312 can compile the networktopology information into a JSON object and pass it downstream to otheroperators or services, such as Unified Collector 314.

Unified Collector 314 can receive the topological view or model fromTopology Explorer 312 and use the topology information to collectinformation for network assurance from Fabric 120. Unified Collector 314can poll nodes (e.g., Controllers 116, Leafs 104, Spines 102, etc.) inFabric 120 to collect information from the nodes.

Unified Collector 314 can include one or more collectors (e.g.,collector devices, operators, applications, VMs, etc.) configured tocollect information from Topology Explorer 312 and/or nodes in Fabric120. For example, Unified Collector 314 can include a cluster ofcollectors, and each of the collectors can be assigned to a subset ofnodes within the topological model and/or Fabric 120 in order to collectinformation from their assigned subset of nodes. For performance,Unified Collector 314 can run in a parallel, multi-threaded fashion.

Unified Collector 314 can perform load balancing across individualcollectors in order to streamline the efficiency of the overallcollection process. Load balancing can be optimized by managing thedistribution of subsets of nodes to collectors, for example by randomlyhashing nodes to collectors.

In some cases, Assurance Appliance System 300 can run multiple instancesof Unified Collector 314. This can also allow Assurance Appliance System300 to distribute the task of collecting data for each node in thetopology (e.g., Fabric 120 including Spines 102, Leafs 104, Controllers116, etc.) via sharding and/or load balancing, and map collection tasksand/or nodes to a particular instance of Unified Collector 314 with datacollection across nodes being performed in parallel by various instancesof Unified Collector 314. Within a given node, commands and datacollection can be executed serially. Assurance Appliance System 300 cancontrol the number of threads used by each instance of Unified Collector314 to poll data from Fabric 120.

Unified Collector 314 can collect models (e.g., L_Model 270A and/orLR_Model 270B) from Controllers 116, switch software configurations andmodels (e.g., Ci_Model 274) from nodes (e.g., Leafs 104 and/or Spines102) in Fabric 120, hardware configurations and models (e.g., Hi_Model276) from nodes (e.g., Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102) in Fabric 120, etc.Unified Collector 314 can collect Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 fromindividual nodes or fabric members, such as Leafs 104 and Spines 102,and L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B from one or more controllers(e.g., Controllers 116) in Network Environment 100.

Unified Collector 314 can poll the devices that Topology Explorer 312discovers in order to collect data from Fabric 120 (e.g., from theconstituent members of the fabric). Unified Collector 314 can collectthe data using interfaces exposed by Controllers 116 and/or switchsoftware (e.g., switch OS), including, for example, a RepresentationState Transfer (REST) Interface and a Secure Shell (SSH) Interface.

In some cases, Unified Collector 314 collects L_Model 270A, LR_Model270B, and/or Ci_Model 274 via a REST API, and the hardware information(e.g., configurations, tables, fabric card information, rules, routes,etc.) via SSH using utilities provided by the switch software, such asvirtual shell (VSH or VSHELL) for accessing the switch command-lineinterface (CLI) or VSH_LC shell for accessing runtime state of the linecard.

Unified Collector 314 can poll other information from Controllers 116,including, without limitation: topology information, tenantforwarding/routing information, tenant security policies, contracts,interface policies, physical domain or VMM domain information, OOB(out-of-band) management IP's of nodes in the fabric, etc.

Unified Collector 314 can also poll information from nodes (e.g., Leafs104 and Spines 102) in Fabric 120, including without limitation:Ci_Models 274 for VLANs, BDs, and security policies; Link LayerDiscovery Protocol (LLDP) connectivity information of nodes (e.g., Leafs104 and/or Spines 102); endpoint information from EPM/COOP; fabric cardinformation from Spines 102; routing information base (RIB) tables fromnodes in Fabric 120; forwarding information base (FIB) tables from nodesin Fabric 120; security group hardware tables (e.g., TCAM tables) fromnodes in Fabric 120; etc.

In some cases, Unified Collector 314 can obtain runtime state from thenetwork and incorporate runtime state information into L_Model 270Aand/or LR_Model 270B. Unified Collector 314 can also obtain multiplelogical models from Controllers 116 and generate a comprehensive ornetwork-wide logical model (e.g., L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B)based on the logical models. Unified Collector 314 can compare logicalmodels from Controllers 116, resolve dependencies, remove redundancies,etc., and generate a single L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B for theentire network or fabric.

Unified Collector 314 can collect the entire network state acrossControllers 116 and fabric nodes or members (e.g., Leafs 104 and/orSpines 102). For example, Unified Collector 314 can use a REST interfaceand an SSH interface to collect the network state. This informationcollected by Unified Collector 314 can include data relating to the linklayer, VLANs, BDs, VRFs, security policies, etc. The state informationcan be represented in LR_Model 270B, as previously mentioned. UnifiedCollector 314 can then publish the collected information and models toany downstream operators that are interested in or require suchinformation. Unified Collector 314 can publish information as it isreceived, such that data is streamed to the downstream operators.

Data collected by Unified Collector 314 can be compressed and sent todownstream services. In some examples, Unified Collector 314 can collectdata in an online fashion or real-time fashion, and send the datadownstream, as it is collected, for further analysis. In some examples,Unified Collector 314 can collect data in an offline fashion, andcompile the data for later analysis or transmission.

Assurance Appliance System 300 can contact Controllers 116, Spines 102,Leafs 104, and other nodes to collect various types of data. In somescenarios, Assurance Appliance System 300 may experience a failure(e.g., connectivity problem, hardware or software error, etc.) thatprevents it from being able to collect data for a period of time.Assurance Appliance System 300 can handle such failures seamlessly, andgenerate events based on such failures.

Switch Logical Policy Generator 316 can receive L_Model 270A and/orLR_Model 270B from Unified Collector 314 and calculate Li_Model 272 foreach network device i (e.g., switch i) in Fabric 120. For example,Switch Logical Policy Generator 316 can receive L_Model 270A and/orLR_Model 270B and generate Li_Model 272 by projecting a logical modelfor each individual node i (e.g., Spines 102 and/or Leafs 104) in Fabric120. Switch Logical Policy Generator 316 can generate Li_Model 272 foreach switch in Fabric 120, thus creating a switch logical model based onL_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B for each switch.

Each Li_Model 272 can represent L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B asprojected or applied at the respective network device i (e.g., switch i)in Fabric 120. In some cases, Li_Model 272 can be normalized orformatted in a manner that is compatible with the respective networkdevice. For example, Li_Model 272 can be formatted in a manner that canbe read or executed by the respective network device. To illustrate,Li_Model 272 can included specific identifiers (e.g., hardware planeidentifiers used by Controllers 116 as classifiers, etc.) or tags (e.g.,policy group tags) that can be interpreted by the respective networkdevice. In some cases, Li_Model 272 can include JSON objects. Forexample, Li_Model 272 can include JSON objects to represent rules,filters, entries, scopes, etc.

The format used for Li_Model 272 can be the same as, or consistent with,the format of Ci_Model 274. For example, both Li_Model 272 and Ci_Model274 may be based on JSON objects. Similar or matching formats can enableLi_Model 272 and Ci_Model 274 to be compared for equivalence orcongruence. Such equivalency checks can aid in network analysis andassurance as further explained herein.

Switch Logical Configuration Generator 316 can also perform changeanalysis and generate lint events or records for problems discovered inL_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B. The lint events or records can beused to generate alerts for a user or network operator.

Policy Operator 318 can receive Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 for eachswitch from Unified Collector 314, and Li_Model 272 for each switch fromSwitch Logical Policy Generator 316, and perform assurance checks andanalysis (e.g., security adherence checks, TCAM utilization analysis,etc.) based on Ci_Model 274, Hi_Model 276, and Li_Model 272. PolicyOperator 318 can perform assurance checks on a switch-by-switch basis bycomparing one or more of the models.

Returning to Unified Collector 314, Unified Collector 314 can also sendL_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B to Routing Policy Parser 320, andCi_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 to Routing Parser 326.

Routing Policy Parser 320 can receive L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270Band parse the model(s) for information that may be relevant todownstream operators, such as Endpoint Checker 322 and Tenant RoutingChecker 324. Similarly, Routing Parser 326 can receive Ci_Model 274 andHi_Model 276 and parse each model for information for downstreamoperators, Endpoint Checker 322 and Tenant Routing Checker 324.

After Ci_Model 274, Hi_Model 276, L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B areparsed, Routing Policy Parser 320 and/or Routing Parser 326 can sendcleaned-up protocol buffers (Proto Buffs) to the downstream operators,Endpoint Checker 322 and Tenant Routing Checker 324. Endpoint Checker322 can then generate events related to Endpoint violations, such asduplicate IPs, APIPA, etc., and Tenant Routing Checker 324 can generateevents related to the deployment of BDs, VRFs, subnets, routing tableprefixes, etc.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example diagram 400 for constructing node-specificlogical networks (e.g., Li_Models 272) based on a Logical Model 270 of anetwork, such as Network Environment 100. Logical Model 270 can includeL_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B, as shown in FIG. 2D. Logical Model270 can include objects and configurations of the network to be pushedto the devices in Fabric 120, such as Leafs 104. Logical Model 270 canprovide a network-wide representation of the network. Thus, LogicalModel 270 can be used to construct a Node-Specific Logical Model (e.g.,Li_Model 272) for nodes in Fabric 120 (e.g., Leafs 104).

Logical Model 270 can be adapted for each of the nodes (e.g., Leafs 104)in order to generate a respective logical model for each node, whichrepresents, and/or corresponds to, the portion(s) and/or informationfrom Logical Model 270 that is pertinent to the node, and/or theportion(s) and/or information from Logical Model 270 that should be,and/or is, pushed, stored, and/or rendered at the node. Each of theNode-Specific Logical Models, Li_Model 272, can contain those objects,properties, configurations, data, etc., from Logical Model 270 thatpertain to the specific node, including any portion(s) from LogicalModel 270 projected or rendered on the specific node when thenetwork-wide intent specified by Logical Model 270 is propagated orprojected to the individual node. In other words, to carry out theintent specified in Logical Model 270, the individual nodes (e.g., Leafs104) can implement respective portions of Logical Model 270 such thattogether, the individual nodes can carry out the intent specified inLogical Model 270.

FIG. 5A illustrates a schematic diagram of an example system for policyanalysis in a network (e.g., Network Environment 100). Policy Analyzer504 can perform assurance checks to detect configuration violations,logical lint events, contradictory or conflicting policies, unusedcontracts, incomplete configurations, routing checks, rendering errors,incorrect rules, etc. Policy Analyzer 504 can check the specification ofthe user's intent or intents in L_Model 270A (or Logical Model 270 asshown in FIG. 4) to determine if any configurations in Controllers 116are inconsistent with the specification of the user's intent or intents.

Policy Analyzer 504 can include one or more of the Operators 310executed or hosted in Assurance Appliance System 300. However, in otherconfigurations, Policy Analyzer 504 can run one or more operators orengines that are separate from Operators 310 and/or Assurance ApplianceSystem 300. For example, Policy Analyzer 504 can be implemented via aVM, a software container, a cluster of VMs or software containers, anendpoint, a collection of endpoints, a service function chain, etc., anyof which may be separate from Assurance Appliance System 300.

Policy Analyzer 504 can receive as input Logical Model Collection 502,which can include Logical Model 270 as shown in FIG. 4; and/or L_Model270A, LR_Model 270B, and/or Li_Model 272 as shown in FIG. 2D. PolicyAnalyzer 504 can also receive as input Rules 508. Rules 508 can bedefined, for example, per feature (e.g., per object, per objectproperty, per contract, per rule, etc.) in one or more logical modelsfrom the Logical Model Collection 502. Rules 508 can be based onobjects, relationships, definitions, configurations, and any otherfeatures in MIM 200. Rules 508 can specify conditions, relationships,parameters, and/or any other information for identifying configurationviolations or issues.

Rules 508 can include information for identifying syntactic violationsor issues. For example, Rules 508 can include one or more statementsand/or conditions for performing syntactic checks. Syntactic checks canverify that the configuration of a logical model and/or the LogicalModel Collection 502 is complete, and can help identify configurationsor rules from the logical model and/or the Logical Model Collection 502that are not being used. Syntactic checks can also verify that theconfigurations in the hierarchical MIM 200 have been properly orcompletely defined in the Logical Model Collection 502, and identify anyconfigurations that are defined but not used. To illustrate, Rules 508can specify that every tenant defined in the Logical Model Collection502 should have a context configured; every contract in the LogicalModel Collection 502 should specify a provider EPG and a consumer EPG;every contract in the Logical Model Collection 502 should specify asubject, filter, and/or port; etc.

Rules 508 can also include information for performing semantic checksand identifying semantic violations. Semantic checks can checkconflicting rules or configurations. For example, Rule1 and Rule2 canoverlap and create aliasing issues, Rule1 can be more specific thanRule2 and result in conflicts, Rule1 can mask Rule2 or inadvertentlyoverrule Rule2 based on respective priorities, etc. Thus, Rules 508 candefine conditions which may result in aliased rules, conflicting rules,etc. To illustrate, Rules 508 can indicate that an allow policy for aspecific communication between two objects may conflict with a denypolicy for the same communication between two objects if the allowpolicy has a higher priority than the deny policy. Rules 508 canindicate that a rule for an object renders another rule unnecessary dueto aliasing and/or priorities. As another example, Rules 508 canindicate that a QoS policy in a contract conflicts with a QoS rulestored on a node.

Policy Analyzer 504 can apply Rules 508 to the Logical Model Collection502 to check configurations in the Logical Model Collection 502 andoutput Configuration Violation Events 506 (e.g., alerts, logs,notifications, etc.) based on any issues detected. ConfigurationViolation Events 506 can include semantic or semantic problems, such asincomplete configurations, conflicting configurations, aliased rules,unused configurations, errors, policy violations, misconfigured objects,incomplete configurations, incorrect contract scopes, improper objectrelationships, etc.

In some cases, Policy Analyzer 504 can iteratively traverse each node ina tree generated based on the Logical Model Collection 502 and/or MIM200, and apply Rules 508 at each node in the tree to determine if anynodes yield a violation (e.g., incomplete configuration, improperconfiguration, unused configuration, etc.). Policy Analyzer 504 canoutput Configuration Violation Events 506 when it detects anyviolations.

FIG. 5B illustrates an example equivalency diagram 510 of networkmodels. In this example, the Logical Model 270 can be compared with theHi_Model 276 obtained from one or more Leafs 104 in the Fabric 120. Thiscomparison can provide an equivalency check in order to determinewhether the logical configuration of the Network Environment 100 at theController(s) 116 is consistent with, or conflicts with, the rulesrendered on the one or more Leafs 104 (e.g., rules and/or configurationsin storage, such as TCAM). For explanation purposes, Logical Model 270and Hi_Model 276 are illustrated as the models compared in theequivalency check example in FIG. 5B. However, it should be noted that,in other examples, other models can be checked to perform an equivalencycheck for those models. For example, an equivalency check can compareLogical Model 270 with Ci_Model 274 and/or Hi_Model 276, Li_Model 272with Ci_Model 274 and/or Hi_Model 276, Ci_Model 274 with Hi_Model 276,etc.

Equivalency checks can identify whether the network operator'sconfigured intent is consistent with the network's actual behavior, aswell as whether information propagated between models and/or devices inthe network is consistent, conflicts, contains errors, etc. For example,a network operator can define objects and configurations for NetworkEnvironment 100 from Controller(s) 116. Controller(s) 116 can store thedefinitions and configurations from the network operator and construct alogical model (e.g., L_Model 270A) of the Network Environment 100. TheController(s) 116 can push the definitions and configurations providedby the network operator and reflected in the logical model to each ofthe nodes (e.g., Leafs 104) in the Fabric 120. In some cases, theController(s) 116 may push a node-specific version of the logical model(e.g., Li_Model 272) that reflects the information in the logical modelof the network (e.g., L_Model 270A) pertaining to that node.

The nodes in the Fabric 120 can receive such information and render orcompile rules on the node's software (e.g., Operating System). Therules/configurations rendered or compiled on the node's software can beconstructed into a Construct Model (e.g., Ci_Model 274). The rules fromthe Construct Model can then be pushed from the node's software to thenode's hardware (e.g., TCAM) and stored or rendered as rules on thenode's hardware. The rules stored or rendered on the node's hardware canbe constructed into a Hardware Model (e.g., Hi_Model 276) for the node.

The various models (e.g., Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model 276) can thusrepresent the rules and configurations at each stage (e.g., intentspecification at Controller(s) 116, rendering or compiling on the node'ssoftware, rendering or storing on the node's hardware, etc.) as thedefinitions and configurations entered by the network operator arepushed through each stage. Accordingly, an equivalency check of variousmodels, such as Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model 276, Li_Model 272 andCi_Model 274 or Hi_Model 276, Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276, etc., canbe used to determine whether the definitions and configurations havebeen properly pushed, rendered, and/or stored at any stage associatedwith the various models.

If the models pass the equivalency check, then the definitions andconfigurations at checked stage (e.g., Controller(s) 116, software onthe node, hardware on the node, etc.) can be verified as accurate andconsistent. By contrast, if there is an error in the equivalency check,then a misconfiguration can be detected at one or more specific stages.The equivalency check between various models can also be used todetermine where (e.g., at which stage) the problem or misconfigurationhas occurred. For example, the stage where the problem ormisconfiguration occurred can be ascertained based on which model(s)fail the equivalency check.

The Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model 276 can store or render the rules,configurations, properties, definitions, etc., in a respective structure512A, 512B. For example, Logical Model 270 can store or render rules,configurations, objects, properties, etc., in a data structure 512A,such as a file or object (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.), and Hi_Model 276 canstore or render rules, configurations, etc., in a storage 512B, such asTCAM memory. The structure 512A, 512B associated with Logical Model 270and Hi_Model 276 can influence the format, organization, type, etc., ofthe data (e.g., rules, configurations, properties, definitions, etc.)stored or rendered.

For example, Logical Model 270 can store the data as objects and objectproperties 514A, such as EPGs, contracts, filters, tenants, contexts,BDs, network wide parameters, etc. The Hi_Model 276 can store the dataas values and tables 514B, such as value/mask pairs, range expressions,auxiliary tables, etc.

As a result, the data in Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model 276 can benormalized, canonized, diagramed, modeled, re-formatted, flattened,etc., to perform an equivalency between Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model276. For example, the data can be converted using bit vectors, Booleanfunctions, ROBDDs, etc., to perform a mathematical check of equivalencybetween Logical Model 270 and Hi_Model 276.

FIG. 5C illustrates example Architecture 520 for performing equivalencechecks of input models. Rather than employing brute force to determinethe equivalence of input models, the network models can instead berepresented as specific data structures, such as Reduced Ordered BinaryDecision Diagrams (ROBDDs) and/or bit vectors. In this example, inputmodels are represented as ROBDDs, where each ROBDD is canonical (unique)to the input rules and their priority ordering.

Each network model is first converted to a flat list of priority orderedrules. In some examples, contracts can be specific to EPGs and thusdefine communications between EPGs, and rules can be the specificnode-to-node implementation of such contracts. Architecture 520 includesa Formal Analysis Engine 522. In some cases, Formal Analysis Engine 522can be part of Policy Analyzer 504 and/or Assurance Appliance System300. For example, Formal Analysis Engine 522 can be hosted within, orexecuted by, Policy Analyzer 504 and/or Assurance Appliance System 300.To illustrate, Formal Analysis Engine 522 can be implemented via one ormore operators, VMs, containers, servers, applications, servicefunctions, etc., on Policy Analyzer 504 and/or Assurance ApplianceSystem 300. In other cases, Formal Analysis Engine 522 can be separatefrom Policy Analyzer 504 and/or Assurance Appliance System 300. Forexample, Formal Analysis Engine 522 can be a standalone engine, acluster of engines hosted on multiple systems or networks, a servicefunction chain hosted on one or more systems or networks, a VM, asoftware container, a cluster of VMs or software containers, acloud-based service, etc.

Formal Analysis Engine 522 includes an ROBDD Generator 526. ROBDDGenerator 526 receives Input 524 including flat lists of priorityordered rules for Models 272, 274, 276 as shown in FIG. 2D. These rulescan be represented as Boolean functions, where each rule consists of anaction (e.g. Permit, Permit_Log, Deny, Deny_Log) and a set of conditionsthat will trigger that action (e.g. one or more configurations oftraffic, such as a packet source, destination, port, header, QoS policy,priority marking, etc.). For example, a rule might be designed as Permitall traffic on port 80. In some examples, each rule might be an n-bitstring with m-fields of key-value pairs. For example, each rule might bea 147 bit string with 13 fields of key-value pairs.

As a simplified example, consider a flat list of the priority orderedrules L1, L2, L3, and L4 in Li_Model 272, where L1 is the highestpriority rule and L4 is the lowest priority rule. A given packet isfirst checked against rule L1. If L1 is triggered, then the packet ishandled according to the action contained in rule L1. Otherwise, thepacket is then checked against rule L2. If L2 is triggered, then thepacket is handled according to the action contained in rule L2.Otherwise, the packet is then checked against rule L3, and so on, untilthe packet either triggers a rule or reaches the end of the listing ofrules.

The ROBDD Generator 526 can calculate one or more ROBDDs for theconstituent rules L1-L4 of one or more models. An ROBDD can be generatedfor each action encoded by the rules L1-L4, or each action that may beencoded by the rules L1-L4, such that there is a one-to-onecorrespondence between the number of actions and the number of ROBDDsgenerated. For example, the rules L1-L4 might be used to generateL_Permit_(BDD), L_Permit_Log_(BDD), L_Deny-_(BDD), and L_Deny_Log_(BDD).

Generally, ROBDD Generator 526 begins its calculation with the highestpriority rule of Input 524 in the listing of rules received. Continuingthe example of rules L1-L4 in Li_Model 272, ROBDD Generator 526 beginswith rule L1. Based on the action specified by rule L1 (e.g. Permit,Permit_Log, Deny, Deny_Log), rule L1 is added to the corresponding ROBDDfor that action. Next, rule L2 will be added to the corresponding ROBDDfor the action that it specifies. In some examples, a reduced form of L2can be used, given by L1′L2, with L1′ denoting the inverse of L1. Thisprocess is then repeated for rules L3 and L4, which have reduced formsgiven by (L1+L2)′L3 and (L1+L2+L3)′L4, respectively.

Notably, L_Permit_(BDD) and each of the other action-specific ROBDDsencode the portion of each constituent rule L1, L2, L3, L4 that is notalready captured by higher priority rules. That is, L1′L2 represents theportion of rule L2 that does not overlap with rule L1, (L1+L2)′L3represents the portion of rule L3 that does not overlap with eitherrules L1 or L2, and (L1+L2+L3)′L4 represents the portion of rule L4 thatdoes not overlap with either rules L1 or L2 or L3. This reduced form canbe independent of the action specified by an overlapping or higherpriority rule and can be calculated based on the conditions that willcause the higher priority rules to trigger.

ROBDD Generator 526 likewise can generate an ROBDD for each associatedaction of the remaining models associated with Input 524, such asCi_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 in this example, or any other modelsreceived by ROBDD Generator 526. From the ROBDDs generated, the formalequivalence of any two or more ROBDDs of models can be checked viaEquivalence Checker 528, which builds a conflict ROBDD encoding theareas of conflict between input ROBDDs.

In some examples, the ROBDDs being compared will be associated with thesame action. For example, Equivalence Checker 528 can check the formalequivalence of L_Permit_(BDD) against H_Permit_(BDD) by calculating theexclusive disjunction between L_Permit_(BDD) and H_Permit_(BDD). Moreparticularly, L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD) (i.e. L_Permit_(BDD) XORH_Permit_(BDD)) is calculated, although it is understood that thedescription below is also applicable to other network models (e.g.,Logical Model 270, L_Model 270A, LR_Model 270B, Li_Model 272, Ci_Model274, Hi_Model 276, etc.) and associated actions (Permit, Permit_Log,Deny, Deny_Log, etc.).

An example calculation is illustrated in FIG. 6A, which depicts asimplified representation of a Permit conflict ROBDD 600 a calculatedfor L_Permit_(BDD) and H_Permit_(BDD). As illustrated, L_Permit_(BDD)includes a unique portion 602 (shaded) and an overlap 604 (unshaded).Similarly, H_Permit_(BDD) includes a unique portion 606 (shaded) and thesame overlap 604.

The Permit conflict ROBDD 600 a includes unique portion 602, whichrepresents the set of packet configurations and network actions that areencompassed within L_Permit_(BDD) but not H_Permit_(BDD) (i.e.calculated as L_Permit_(BDD)*H_Permit_(BDD)′), and unique portion 606,which represents the set of packet configurations and network actionsthat are encompassed within H_Permit_(BDD) but not L_Permit_(BDD) (i.e.calculated as L_Permit_(BDD)′*H_Permit_(BDD)). Note that the unshadedoverlap 604 is not part of Permit conflict ROBDD 600 a.

Conceptually, the full circle illustrating L_Permit_(BDD) (e.g. uniqueportion 602 and overlap 604) represents the fully enumerated set ofpacket configurations that are encompassed within, or trigger, thePermit rules encoded by input model Li_Model 272. For example, assumeLi_Model 272 contains the rules:

-   -   L1: port=[1-3] Permit    -   L2: port=4 Permit    -   L3: port=[6-8] Permit    -   L4: port=9 Deny        where ‘port’ represents the port number of a received packet,        then the circle illustrating L_Permit_(BDD) contains the set of        all packets with port, [1-3], 4, [6-8] that are permitted.        Everything outside of this full circle represents the space of        packet conditions and/or actions that are different from those        specified by the Permit rules contained in Li_Model 272. For        example, rule L4 encodes port=9 Deny and would fall outside of        the region carved out by L_Permit_(BDD).

Similarly, the full circle illustrating H_Permit_(BDD) (e.g., uniqueportion 606 and overlap 604) represents the fully enumerated set ofpacket configurations and network actions that are encompassed within,or trigger, the Permit rules encoded by the input model Hi_Model 276,which contains the rules and/or configurations rendered in hardware.Assume that Hi_Model 276 contains the rules:

-   -   H1: port=[1-3] Permit    -   H2: port=5 Permit    -   H3: port=[6-8] Deny    -   H4: port=10 Deny_Log        In the comparison between L_Permit_(BDD) and H_Permit_(BDD),        only rules L1 and H1 are equivalent, because they match on both        packet condition and action. L2 and H2 are not equivalent        because even though they specify the same action (Permit), this        action is triggered on a different port number (4 vs. 5). L3 and        H3 are not equivalent because even though they trigger on the        same port number (6-8), they trigger different actions (Permit        vs. Deny). L4 and H4 are not equivalent because they trigger on        a different port number (9 vs. 10) and also trigger different        actions (Deny vs. Deny_Log). As such, overlap 604 contains only        the set of packets that are captured by Permit rules L1 and H1,        i.e., the packets with port=[1-3] that are permitted. Unique        portion 602 contains only the set of packets that are captured        by the Permit rules L2 and L3, while unique portion 606 contains        only the set of packets that are captured by Permit rule H2.        These two unique portions encode conflicts between the packet        conditions upon which Li_Model 272 will trigger a Permit, and        the packet conditions upon which the hardware rendered Hi_Model        276 will trigger a Permit. Consequently, it is these two unique        portions 602 and 606 that make up Permit conflict ROBDD 600 a.        The remaining rules L4, H3, and H4 are not Permit rules and        consequently are not represented in L_Permit_(BDD), or Permit        conflict ROBDD H_Permit_(BDD), 600 a.

In general, the action-specific overlaps between any two models containthe set of packets that will trigger the same action no matter whetherthe rules of the first model or the rules of the second model areapplied, while the action-specific conflict ROBDDs between these sametwo models contains the set of packets that result in conflicts by wayof triggering on a different condition, triggering a different action,or both.

It should be noted that in the example described above with respect toFIG. 6A, Li_Model 272 and Hi_Model 276 are used as example input modelsfor illustration purposes, but other models may be similarly used. Forexample, in some cases, a conflict ROBDD can be calculated based onLogical Model 270, as shown in FIG. 4, and/or any of the models 270A,270B, 272, 274, 276, as shown in FIG. 2D.

Moreover, for purposes of clarity in the discussion above, Permitconflict ROBDD 600 a portrays L_Permit_(BDD) and H_Permit_(BDD) assingular entities rather than illustrating the effect of each individualrule. Accordingly, FIGS. 6B and 6C present Permit conflict ROBDDs withindividual rules depicted. FIG. 6B presents a Permit conflict ROBDD 600b taken between the illustrated listing of rules L1, L2, H1, and H2.FIG. 6C presents a Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c that adds rule H3 toPermit conflict ROBDD 600 b. Both Figures maintain the same shadingconvention introduced in FIG. 6A, wherein a given conflict ROBDDcomprises only the shaded regions that are shown.

Turning first to FIG. 6B, illustrated is a Permit conflict ROBDD 600 bthat is calculated across a second L_Permit_(BDD) consisting of rules L1and L2, and a second H_Permit_(BDD) consisting of rules H1 and H2. Asillustrated, rules L1 and H1 are identical, and entirely overlap withone another—both rules consists of the overlap 612 and overlap 613.Overlap 612 is common between rules L1 and H1, while overlap 613 iscommon between rules L1, H1, and L2. For purposes of subsequentexplanation, assume that rules L1 and H1 are both defined by port=[1-13]Permit.

Rules L2 and H2 are not identical. Rule L2 consists of overlap 613,unique portion 614, and overlap 616. Rule H2 consists only of overlap616, as it is contained entirely within the region encompassed by ruleL2. For example, rule L2 might be port=[10-20] Permit, whereas rule H2might be port=[15-17] Permit. Conceptually, this is an example of anerror that might be encountered by a network assurance check, wherein anLi_Model 272 rule (e.g., L2) specified by a user intent was incorrectlyrendered into a node's memory (e.g., switch TCAM) as an Hi_Model 276rule (e.g., H2). In particular, the scope of the rendered Hi_Model 276rule H2 is smaller than the intended scope specified by the user intentcontained in L2. For example, such a scenario could arise if a switchTCAM runs out of space, and does not have enough free entries toaccommodate a full representation of an Li_Model 272 rule.

Regardless of the cause, this error is detected by the construction ofthe Permit conflict ROBDD 600 b as L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD), wherethe results of this calculation are indicated by the shaded uniqueportion 614. This unique portion 614 represents the set of packetconfigurations and network actions that are contained withinL_Permit_(BDD) but not H_Permit_(BDD). In particular, unique portion 614is contained within the region encompassed by rule L2 but is notcontained within either of the regions encompassed by rules H1 and H2,and specifically comprises the set defined by port=[14, 18-20] Permit.

To understand how this is determined, recall that rule L2 is representedby port=[10-20] Permit. Rule H1 carves out the portion of L2 defined byport=[10-13] Permit, which is represented as overlap 613. Rule H2 carvesout the portion of L2 defined by port=[15-17] Permit, which isrepresented as overlap 616. This leaves only port=[14, 18-20] Permit asthe non-overlap portion of the region encompassed by L2, or in otherwords, the unique portion 614 comprises Permit conflict ROBDD 600 b.

FIG. 6C illustrates a Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c which is identical toPermit conflict ROBDD 600 b with the exception of a newly added thirdrule, H3: port=[19-25] Permit. Rule H3 includes an overlap portion 628,which represents the set of conditions and actions that are contained inboth rules H3 and L2, and further consists of a unique portion 626,which represents the set of conditions and actions that are containedonly in rule H3. Conceptually, this could represent an error wherein anLi_Model 272 rule (e.g., L2) specified by a user intent was incorrectlyrendered into node memory as two Hi_Model 276 rules (e.g., H2 and H3).There is no inherent fault with a single Li_Model 272 rule beingrepresented as multiple Hi_Model 276 rules. Rather, the fault hereinlies in the fact that the two corresponding Hi_Model 276 rules do notadequately capture the full extent of the set of packet configurationsencompassed by Permit rule L2. Rule H2 is too narrow in comparison torule L2, as discussed above with respect to FIG. 6B, and rule H3 is bothtoo narrow and improperly extended beyond the boundary of the regionencompasses by rule L2.

As was the case before, this error is detected by the construction ofthe conflict ROBDD 600 c, as L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD), where theresults of this calculation are indicated by the shaded unique portion624, representing the set of packet configurations and network actionsthat are contained within L_Permit_(BDD) but not H_Permit_(BDD), and theshaded unique portion 626, representing the set of packet configurationsand network actions that are contained within H_Permit_(BDD) but notL_Permit_(BDD). In particular, unique portion 624 is contained onlywithin rule L2, and comprises the set defined by port=[14, 18] Permit,while unique portion 626 is contained only within rule H3, and comprisesthe set defined by port=[21-25] Permit. Thus, Permit conflict ROBDD 600c comprises the set defined by port, [14, 18, 21-25] Permit.

Reference is made above only to Permit conflict ROBDDs, although it isunderstood that conflict ROBDDs are generated for each action associatedwith a given model. For example, a complete analysis of the Li_Model 272and Hi_Model 276 mentioned above might entail using ROBDD Generator 526to generate the eight ROBDDs L_Permit_(BDD), L_Permit_Log_(BDD),L-_Deny_(BDD), and L_Deny_Log_(BDD), H_Permit_(BDD), H_Permit_LOG_(BDD),H_Deny_(BDD), and H-_Deny_Log_(BDD), and then using Equivalence Checker528 to generate a Permit conflict ROBDD, Permit_Log conflict ROBDD, Denyconflict ROBDD, and Deny_Log conflict ROBDD.

In general, Equivalence Checker 528 generates action-specific conflictROBDDs based on input network models, or input ROBDDs from ROBDDGenerator 526. As illustrated in FIG. 5C, Equivalence Checker 528receives the input pairs (L_(BDD), H_(BDD)), (L_(BDD), C_(BDD)),(C_(BDD), H_(BDD)), although it is understood that these representationsare for clarity purposes, and may be replaced with any of theaction-specific ROBDDs discussed above. From these action-specificconflict ROBDDs, Equivalence Checker 528 may determine that there is noconflict between the inputs—that is, a given action-specific conflictROBDD is empty. In the context of the examples of FIGS. 6A-6C, an emptyconflict ROBDD would correspond to no shaded portions being present. Inthe case where this determination is made for the given action-specificconflict ROBDD, Equivalence Checker 528 might generate a correspondingaction-specific “PASS” indication 530 that can be transmitted externallyfrom formal analysis engine 522.

However, if Equivalence Checker 528 determines that there is a conflictbetween the inputs, and that a given action-specific conflict ROBDD isnot empty, then Equivalence Checker 528 will not generate PASSindication 530, and can instead transmit the given action-specificconflict ROBDD 532 to a Conflict Rules Identifier 534, which identifiesthe specific conflict rules that are present. In some examples, anaction-specific “PASS” indication 530 can be generated for everyaction-specific conflict ROBDD that is determined to be empty. In someexamples, the “PASS” indication 530 might only be generated and/ortransmitted once every action-specific conflict ROBDD has beendetermined to be empty.

In instances where one or more action-specific conflict ROBDDs arereceived, Conflict Rules Identifier 534 may also receive as input theflat listing of priority ordered rules that are represented in each ofthe conflict ROBDDs 532. For example, if Conflict Rules Identifier 534receives the Permit conflict ROBDD corresponding to L_Permit_(BDD)⊕H_Permit_(BDD), the underlying flat listings of priority ordered rulesLi, Hi used to generate L_Permit_(BDD) and H_Permit_(BDD) are alsoreceived as input.

The Conflict Rules Identifier 534 then identifies specific conflictrules from each listing of priority ordered rules and builds a listingof conflict rules 536. In order to do so, Conflict Rules Identifier 534iterates through the rules contained within a given listing andcalculates the intersection between the set of packet configurations andnetwork actions that is encompassed by each given rule, and the set thatis encompassed by the action-specific conflict ROBDD. For example,assume that a list of j rules was used to generate L_Permit_(BDD). Foreach rule j, Conflict Rules Identifier 534 computes:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*L _(j)If this calculation equals zero, then the given rule L_(j) is not partof the conflict ROBDD and therefore is not a conflict rule. If, however,this calculation does not equal zero, then the given rule L_(j) is partof the Permit conflict ROBDD and therefore is a conflict rule that isadded to the listing of conflict rules 536.

For example, in FIG. 6C, Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c includes the shadedportions 624 and 626. Starting with the two rules L1, L2 used togenerate L_Permit_(BDD), it can be calculated that:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*L1=0Thus, rule L1 does not overlap with Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c andtherefore is not a conflict rule. However, it can be calculated that:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*L2≠0Meaning that rule L2 does overlap with Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c atoverlap portion 624 and therefore is a conflict rule and is added to thelisting of conflict rules 536.

The same form of computation can also be applied to the list of rulesH1, H2, H3, used to generate H_Permit_(BDD). It can be calculated that:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*H1=0Thus, rule H1 does not overlap with Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c andtherefore is not a conflict rule. It can also be calculated that:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*H2=0Thus, rule H2 does not overlap with Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c andtherefore is not a conflict rule. Finally, it can be calculated that:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*H3≠0Meaning that rule H2 does overlap with Permit conflict ROBDD 600 c atoverlap portion 626 and therefore is a conflict rule and can be added tothe listing of conflict rules 552. In the context of the presentexample, the complete listing of conflict rules 536 derived from Permitconflict ROBDD 600 c is {L2, H3}, as one or both of these rules havebeen configured or rendered incorrectly.

In some examples, one of the models associated with the Input 524 may betreated as a reference or standard, meaning that the rules containedwithin that model are assumed to be correct. As such, Conflict RulesIdentifier 536 only needs to compute the intersection of a givenaction-specific conflict ROBDD and the set of associated action-specificrules from the non-reference model. For example, the Li_Model 272 can betreated as a reference or standard, because it is directly derived fromuser inputs used to define L_Model 270A, 270B. The Hi_Model 276, on theother hand, passes through several transformations before being renderedinto a node's hardware, and is therefore more likely to be subject toerror. Accordingly, the Conflict Rules Identifier 534 would only compute(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*H _(j)for each of the rules (or each of the Permit rules) j in the Hi_Model276, which can cut the required computation time significantly.

Additionally, Conflict Rules Identifier 534 need not calculate theintersection of the action-specific conflict ROBDD and the entirety ofeach rule, but instead, can use a priority-reduced form of each rule. Inother words, this is the form in which the rule is represented withinthe ROBDD. For example, the priority reduced form of rule H2 is H1′H2,or the contribution of rule H2 minus the portion that is alreadycaptured by rule H1. The priority reduced form of rule H3 is (H1+H2)′H3,or the contribution of rule H3 minus the portion that is alreadycaptured by rules H1 or H2. The priority reduced form of rule H4 is(H1+H2+H3)′H4, or the contribution of rule H4 minus the portion that isalready captured by rules H1 and H2 and H3.

As such, the calculation instead reduces to:(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*(H1+ . . . +H _(j-1))′H _(j)for each rule (or each Permit rule) j that is contained in the Hi_Model276. While there are additional terms introduced in the equation aboveas compared to simply calculating(L_Permit_(BDD) ⊕H_Permit_(BDD))*H _(j).the priority-reduced form is in fact computationally more efficient. Foreach rule j, the priority-reduced form (H1+ . . . +H_(j-1))′H_(j)encompasses a smaller set of packet configurations and network actions,or encompasses an equally sized set, as compared to the non-reduced formH_(j). The smaller the set for which the intersection calculation isperformed against the conflict ROBDD, the more efficient thecomputation.

In some cases, the Conflict Rules Identifier 534 can output a listing ofconflict rules 536 (whether generated from both input models, orgenerated only a single, non-reference input model) to a destinationexternal to Formal Analysis Engine 522. For example, the conflict rules536 can be output to a user or network operator in order to betterunderstand the specific reason that a conflict occurred between models.

In some examples, a Back Annotator 538 can be disposed between ConflictRules Identifier 534 and the external output. Back Annotator 538 canassociate each given rule from the conflict rules listing 536 with thespecific parent contract or other high-level intent that led to thegiven rule being generated. In this manner, not only is a formalequivalence failure explained to a user in terms of the specific rulesthat are in conflict, the equivalence failure is also explained to theuser in terms of the high-level user action, configuration, or intentthat was entered into the network and ultimately created the conflictrule. In this manner, a user can more effectively address conflictrules, by adjusting or otherwise targeting them at their source orparent.

In some examples, the listing of conflict rules 536 may be maintainedand/or transmitted internally to Formal Analysis Engine 522, in order toenable further network assurance analyses and operations such as,without limitation, event generation, counter-example generation, QoSassurance, etc.

The disclosure now turns to FIGS. 7A and 7B, which illustrate examplemethods. FIG. 7A illustrates an example method for general networkassurance, and FIG. 7B illustrates an example method for policyassurance of QoS configurations in a network. The methods are providedby way of example, as there are a variety of ways to carry out themethods. Additionally, while the example methods are illustrated with aparticular order of blocks or steps, those of ordinary skill in the artwill appreciate that FIGS. 7A-B, and the blocks shown therein, can beexecuted in any order and can include fewer or more blocks thanillustrated.

Each block shown in FIGS. 7A-B represents one or more steps, processes,methods or routines in the methods. For the sake of clarity andexplanation purposes, the blocks in FIGS. 7A-B are described withreference to Network Environment 100, Assurance Appliance System 300,and Network Models 270, 270A-B, 272, 274, 276, Policy Analyzer 504, andFormal Equivalence Engine 522, as shown in FIGS. 1A-B, 2D, 3A, 5A, and5C.

With reference to FIG. 7A, at step 700, Assurance Appliance System 300can collect data and obtain models associated with Network Environment100. The models can include Logical Model 270, as shown in FIG. 4,and/or any of Models 270A-B, 272, 274, 276, as shown in FIG. 2D. Thedata can include fabric data (e.g., topology, switch, interfacepolicies, application policies, etc.), network configurations (e.g.,BDs, VRFs, L2 Outs, L3 Outs, protocol configurations, etc.), QoSpolicies (e.g., DSCP, priorities, bandwidth, queuing, transfer rates,SLA rules, performance settings, etc.), security configurations (e.g.,contracts, filters, etc.), application policies (e.g., EPG contracts,application profile settings, application priority, etc.), servicechaining configurations, routing configurations, etc. Other non-limitingexamples of information collected or obtained can include network data(e.g., RIB/FIB, VLAN, MAC, ISIS, DB, BGP, OSPF, ARP, VPC, LLDP, MTU,network or flow state, logs, node information, routes, etc.), rules andtables (e.g., TCAM rules, ECMP tables, routing tables, etc.), endpointdynamics (e.g., EPM, COOP EP DB, etc.), statistics (e.g., TCAM rulehits, interface counters, bandwidth, packets, application usage,resource usage patterns, error rates, latency, dropped packets, etc.).

At step 702, Assurance Appliance System 300 can analyze and model thereceived data and models. For example, Assurance Appliance System 300can perform formal modeling and analysis, which can involve determiningequivalency between models, including configurations, policies, etc.Assurance Appliance System 300 can analyze and/or model some or allportions of the received data and models. For example, in some cases,Assurance Appliance System 300 may analyze and model contracts,policies, rules, and state data, but exclude other portions ofinformation collected or available.

At step 704, Assurance Appliance System 300 can generate one or moresmart events. Assurance Appliance System 300 can generate smart eventsusing deep object hierarchy for detailed analysis, such as Tenants,switches, VRFs, rules, filters, routes, prefixes, ports, contracts,subjects, etc.

At step 706, Assurance Appliance System 300 can visualize the smartevents, analysis and/or models. Assurance Appliance System 300 candisplay problems and alerts for analysis and debugging, in auser-friendly GUI.

FIG. 7B illustrates an example method for policy assurance of QoSconfigurations in a network. In some cases, the method in FIG. 7B can beperformed separate from, or in addition to, the method in FIG. 7A.However, in other cases, the method in FIG. 7B can be part of theassurance method in FIG. 7A. For example, the method in FIG. 7B canrepresent one or more steps within the method in FIG. 7A or a specificapplication of the method in FIG. 7A. To illustrate, the method in FIG.7A can represent an example of a general assurance method which mayanalyze different types of configurations or aspects of the network, andthe method in FIG. 7B can represent an example of a method implementedspecifically for policy assurance of QoS configurations.

At step 720, Assurance Appliance System 300 can obtain one or morelogical models of a network, such as Network Environment 100. Forexample, Assurance Appliance System 300 can obtain Logical Model 270,L_Model 270A, LR_Model 270B, and/or Li_Model 272. In some cases,Assurance Appliance System 300 can obtain a single logical model, or acollection of logical models, such as Logical Model Collection 502 asshown in FIG. 5A. Assurance Appliance System 300 can obtain the one ormore logical models from one or more systems or nodes, such as one ormore Controllers 116. In some cases, Assurance Appliance System 300 maygenerate a logical model or modify a collected logical model.

At step 722, Assurance Appliance System 300 can obtain, for one or morenodes (e.g., Leafs 104) in the network, a respective hardware model,such as Hi_Model 276. For example, Assurance Appliance System 300 cancollect Hi_Model 276 from each node in Fabric 120. Assurance ApplianceSystem 300 can receive, extract, or request Hi_Model 276 from each nodein Fabric 120. The respective hardware model can include configurationsstored or rendered at the respective nodes, as previously explained.Such configurations can be based on a respective node-specificrepresentation or rendering of a logical model of the network, such asLi_Model 272 or Ci_Model 274.

Based on the logical model and the respective hardware model, at step724, Assurance Appliance System 300 can perform an equivalency checkbetween rules in the logical model and rules in the respective hardwaremodel to determine whether the logical model and the respective hardwaremodel contain configuration inconsistencies. For example, AssuranceAppliance System 300 can perform a formal equivalence of the logicalmodel and the respective hardware model via Formal Analysis Engine 522,as previously described with reference to FIGS. 5C and 6A-C.

To illustrate, the logical model and the respective hardware model canbe converted to a flat list of priority ordered rules. These rules canbe represented as Boolean functions, where each rule includes an action(e.g., Permit, Permit_Log, Deny, Deny_Log) and a set of conditions thatwill trigger that action (e.g., various configurations of packet source,destination, port or port range, header, DSCP values, marking levels,etc.). For example, each rule can be represented by a bit string orvector.

The rules can include QoS policies in the logical model and therespective hardware model. The QoS policies can be defined in contractsspecified by a network operator at a controller and reflected in thelogical model of the network. The QoS policies can be used to inform theunderlying network (e.g., Fabric 120) to mark traffic between specifiedtraffic source and destinations with specific QoS values. The QoS valuescan include marking levels (e.g., Level-1, Level-2, Level-3) and targetDSCP (Differentiated Services Code Point) values, which together candefine the priority of associated traffic in the network. Onceconfigured at the controller(s), the contracts defining the QoS policies(as well as other contracts) can be rendered as rules in the nodehardware (e.g., switch TCAM hardware).

To perform equivalence check of QoS policies, the associated rules inthe logical model and the respective hardware model can be converted toone or more data structures. In some cases, the rules can be convertedto Boolean functions representing the QoS policies (e.g., DSCP values,marking levels, etc.) corresponding to a packet space (e.g., source,destination, port value or port range, etc.) and an action (e.g., Allow,Deny, etc.). The Boolean functions can then be used to mathematicallydetermine equivalence between QoS policies in the logical model and therespective hardware model.

In some cases, the rules and/or Boolean functions can be provided asinput for an ROBDD generator (e.g., ROBDD generator 526). The ROBDDgenerator can generate ROBDDs representing the rules and/or Booleanfunctions and perform an equivalence check as previously described withreference to FIGS. 5C and 6A-C. The ROBDDs and equivalence check can beused to determine whether QoS policies in the logical model and therespective hardware model match or contain any errors orinconsistencies. If any inconsistencies are detected, the equivalencecheck can also be used to identify where the error or inconsistency mayhave been created. For example, the equivalence check can be used todetermine if the root cause of an error or inconsistency results from arule in the logical model or a rule in the respective hardware model ofa specific node.

In some examples, the method can perform an equivalence check betweenQoS policies defined in the contracts from the logical model and QoSpolicies rendered as rules on a node's hardware and contained in thatnode's respective hardware model. For example, the method can checkequivalence between the QoS rule(s) in the logical model pertaining toan action (e.g., allow, deny, etc.) for a specific packet space ortuple, such as source, destination, and port or port range, and the QoSrule(s) in the respective hardware model pertaining to the same actionfor the same packet space or tuple. As part of the equivalence check,the method can check that the values of QoS and marking fieldsassociated with a set of packets, which get marked with such values inthe node's hardware (e.g., switch TCAM), are equivalent to the values ofQoS and marking fields specified in the logical model (e.g., viaControllers 116) for that set of packets. This equivalence check canidentify whether QoS rules defined in the logical model are consistentor inconsistent with QoS rules rendered on the node's hardware.

To illustrate, assume the logical model contains the following rules:

L1: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[80]; Action=Allow; DSCP=[11]

L2: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[10]; Action=Allow; CoS=[7]

L3: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[15]; Action=Allow; 802.1pPriority=[7]

In addition, assume the respective hardware model contains the followingrules:

H1: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[80]; Action=Allow; DSCP=[11]

H2: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[10]; Action=Allow; CoS=[7]

H3: Source=[A]; Destination=[B]; Port=[15]; Action=Allow; 802.1pPriority=[1]

The method can perform equivalence checks between L1-L3 and H1-H3 in thelogical model and the respective hardware model, respectively, todetermine whether any associated QoS policies are inequivalent. Forexample, the method can create respective data structures, such asROBDDs for the logical model (e.g., policies L1-L3) and the hardwaremodel (e.g., H1-H3), and use the respective data structures to determineequivalence between the models. The ROBDDs constructed for the logicalmodel and the hardware model can be compared to determine overallequivalence between the models.

For example, ROBBDs can be constructed for the logical model, which inthis example contains rules L1-L3, and the hardware model, which in thisexample contains rules H1-H3. An equivalence check can be performedbetween the logical model and the hardware model based on the respectiveROBDDs. The equivalence check between the logical model and the hardwaremodel can thus verify that the QoS policies in the logical model and thehardware model, including the DSCP, CoS, and 802.1p Priority values inL1-L3 and H1-H3 in the logical and hardware models.

In the above example, the equivalence check between the logical modeland the hardware model can identify inequivalence between the logicalmodel and the hardware model resulting from a mismatch between the802.1p Priority value defined in L3 of the logical model and the 802.1pPriority defined in H3 of the hardware model. As illustrated above, thelogical model defines, via L3, an 802.1p Priority of 7 for packetshaving the Allow action and corresponding to source A, destination B,and port 15, while the hardware model defines, via H3, an 802.1pPriority of 1 for the same packets; namely, packets having the Allowaction and corresponding to source A, destination B, and port 15. Thisconflict or mismatch between the 802.1p Priority defined for the samepackets under the logical and hardware models can result in aninequivalence finding between the logical model and the hardware model.If the 802.1p Priority values were otherwise the same, the equivalencecheck between the logical and hardware models would result in a pass,indicating overall equivalence between the models.

As another example, consider a network operator configures a contractallowing all traffic between ports 10-20 and requiring the traffic tohave QoS enabled with a Level 1 marking and a QoS DSCP value set to 7.This contract is illustrated in the table below.

QoS Contract in the Logical Model

Traffic Src Traffic Dst Port range Action DSCP Marking A B 10-20 Allow 7Level 1

After this QoS contract is deployed on a controller (e.g., Controller116) in the network, the rules associated with the QoS contract arerendered in the node's hardware (e.g., the switch TCAM). Forillustration purposes, this example will assume the node's hardware isswitch TCAM memory.

Since the TCAM is a circuit with binary values and limited resources, insome cases, the switch TCAM may render multiple rules for the contract.This can be due to a variety of problems, such as range expansion,optimizations by the software rendering the TCAM rules, hardwareproblems, etc. For example, the following rules may be rendered in theTCAM for the QoS contract in the above example:

QoS Rules Rendered in the TCAM

Traffic Src Traffic Dst Port range Action DSCP Marking A B 10-15 Allow 7Level 1 A B 15-16 Allow 15 Level 1 A B 16-20 Allow 7 Level 1

The method can check that for all traffic in the switch, the DSCP andmarking values in the TCAM are consistent with the intent specified inthe contract. In the above example, the method can check if the QoSrules rendered in the TCAM are equivalent to the QoS rules in theconfigured contract from the logical model. This QoS assurance methodcan be implemented independent of any optimization techniques or anyother factors that can skew the rules or equivalence. As illustratedbelow, the QoS assurance method would yield an equivalence failure, asthe QoS rules in the configured contract are not equivalent to the QoSrules rendered in the TCAM because they do not result in the same DSCPvalues for all the corresponding packet tuples.

To perform the QoS equivalence check, the method can generate datastructures, such as bit vectors and/or ROBDDs, to represent the DSCP andmarking fields. For example, the method can generate a 16-bitrepresentation for the DSCP and marking fields and compute one or moredata structures for the packet space. When computing the packet space,each bit should have the values 1 or 0. The method computes this packetspace for both the QoS rules in the TCAM (i.e., the respective hardwaremodel) and the rules in the policy specification (i.e., the logicalmodel). The method then checks that the computed packet space for thelogical and hardware models is equivalent.

Thus, continuing on the example above, assume the DSCP, Marking tuple isrepresented by bit vectors. For ease of explanation, the followingexample will only discuss the DSCP representation, and will assume theDSCP is represented by a 4-bit vector, 0xb1b2b3b4. Based on a 4-bitvector, the DSCP value 7 is represented as 0x0111 and the DSCP value 15is represented as 0x1111.

With respect to the QoS contract in the logical model, the set ofpackets LP0_i and LP1_i are computed for each bit b_i in the 4-bitvectors, such that for that set of packets, the contract specified valuefor the bit b_i is 0 and 1 respectively. In this example, a packetcorresponds to the tuple source, destination, and port value (src, dst,port value), and a set of packets corresponds to the tuple source,destination, and port range (src, dst, port range). Thus, for the QoScontract in this example, which has a DSCP value of 7 represented as0x0111, LP0_i is the set (A, B, 10-20) for bit b1, and LP1_i is the set(A, B, 10-20) for bits b2, b3, and b4.

With respect to the QoS rules in the respective hardware model, the setof packets HP0_i and HP1_i are computed for each bit b_i such that theTCAM value of b_i is 0 and 1 respectively. As previously noted, the TCAMin this example has rendered multiple rules from the QoS rule in thelogical model. This can result in multiple sets of packets, and multipleQoS values for a same packet. Thus, in order to compute these sets ofpackets, the rules in TCAM and their priority order are accounted for.

In the above example, the port value 16 has a DSCP value of 15 and 7,and port 15 has a DSCP value of 7 and 15. Since the rule with DSCP value15 for port 16 has a higher priority than the rule with DSCP value 7 forport 16, port 16 is masked by the higher priority rule with the DSCPvalue 15. Moreover, since the rule with DSCP value 7 for port 15 has ahigher priority than the rule with DSCP value 15 for port 15, port 15 ismasked by the higher priority rule with the DSCP value 7.

Thus, for port 16, bit b0 would be 1, as the DSCP value for port 16 inthe respective hardware model is 15, represented as 0x1111 in thisexample. By contrast, bit b0 for port 16 in the logical model would be0, as the DSCP value for port 16 in the logical model is 7 which isrepresented as 0x0111. Accordingly, bit b0 for port 16 would havedifferent DSCP values in the logical model and the respective hardwaremodel (i.e., 0 in the logical model and 1 in the respective hardwaremodel). This results in an equivalence failure for bit b0. Consequently,the equivalence check would identify an inconsistency between the QoScontract in the logical model and the QoS rules rendered in the TCAM andcontained in the respective hardware model. In response, the method mayreport inequivalence for bit b0. The method may also report suchinequivalence to the network operator as a rendering QoS assurance checkfailure.

For port 15, the DSCP values in the logical model and the hardware modelwould match, since port 15 in the TCAM rules would be masked by thehigher priority rule with the DSCP value 7, represented as 0x0111, andthe DSCP value in the QoS rule from the logical model for port 15 isalso 7 and thus also represented as 0x0111.

In some cases, the number of packets can be very large. Accordingly,specialized data structures, such as ROBDDs, can be implemented in theassurance checks to increase performance, processing capabilities, andscalability. For example, an ROBDD can be used to represent a set ofpackets compactly to reduce computational burdens and increasecomputational performance. ROBDDs can also ensure the equivalence checksare independent of TCAM software optimizations. Thus, if the softwarerendering rules to the switch change, the assurance method will stillwork.

To illustrate, the bits in the 4-bit vectors constructed for the QoScontract and TCAM rules in the example above can be used to generateROBDDs for the equivalence check. For example, an ROBDD can be generatedbased on each bit in each 4-bit vector constructed for the example QoScontract and TCAM rules. The ROBDDs can then be compared to determineequivalence, as previously described with respect to FIGS. 5C and 6Athrough 6C.

A QoS check failure implies that a contract has not been renderedcorrectly on the switch. This may happen due to various reasons. Forexample, this rendering problem can be a result of a transientcondition, as the contract may be in the process of being rendered whenthe models are obtained (e.g., polled from a Controller 116 and Leaf104). To eliminate this issue, a hysteresis service can be performed tocheck if a failing rendering check continues to fail in subsequentpolls.

Since there may be multiple switches controlled by the Controllers 116,in order to analyze the rendering of contracts across all the switches,aggregation logic can be used to aggregate the result for differentswitches. The aggregated results can be published to a database anddisplayed to the network operator using a GUI, or otherwise reported tothe network operator.

The disclosure now turns to FIGS. 8 and 9, which illustrate examplenetwork and computing devices, such as switches, routers, loadbalancers, servers, client computers, and so forth.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example network device 800 suitable for performingswitching, routing, assurance, and other networking operations. Networkdevice 800 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 804, interfaces 802,and a connection 810 (e.g., a PCI bus). When acting under the control ofappropriate software or firmware, the CPU 804 is responsible forexecuting packet management, error detection, and/or routing functions.The CPU 804 preferably accomplishes all these functions under thecontrol of software including an operating system and any appropriateapplications software. CPU 804 may include one or more processors 808,such as a processor from the INTEL X86 family of microprocessors. Insome cases, processor 808 can be specially designed hardware forcontrolling the operations of network device 800. In some cases, amemory 806 (e.g., non-volatile RAM, ROM, TCAM, etc.) also forms part ofCPU 804. However, there are many different ways in which memory could becoupled to the system. In some cases, the network device 800 can includea memory and/or storage hardware, such as TCAM, separate from CPU 804.Such memory and/or storage hardware can be coupled with the networkdevice 800 and its components via, for example, connection 810.

The interfaces 802 are typically provided as modular interface cards(sometimes referred to as “line cards”). Generally, they control thesending and receiving of data packets over the network and sometimessupport other peripherals used with the network device 800. Among theinterfaces that may be provided are Ethernet interfaces, frame relayinterfaces, cable interfaces, DSL interfaces, token ring interfaces, andthe like. In addition, various very high-speed interfaces may beprovided such as fast token ring interfaces, wireless interfaces,Ethernet interfaces, Gigabit Ethernet interfaces, ATM interfaces, HSSIinterfaces, POS interfaces, FDDI interfaces, WIFI interfaces, 3G/4G/5Gcellular interfaces, CAN BUS, LoRA, and the like. Generally, theseinterfaces may include ports appropriate for communication with theappropriate media. In some cases, they may also include an independentprocessor and, in some instances, volatile RAM. The independentprocessors may control such communications intensive tasks as packetswitching, media control, signal processing, crypto processing, andmanagement. By providing separate processors for the communicationsintensive tasks, these interfaces allow the master microprocessor 804 toefficiently perform routing computations, network diagnostics, securityfunctions, etc.

Although the system shown in FIG. 8 is one specific network device ofthe present disclosure, it is by no means the only network devicearchitecture on which the concepts herein can be implemented. Forexample, an architecture having a single processor that handlescommunications as well as routing computations, etc., can be used.Further, other types of interfaces and media could also be used with thenetwork device 800.

Regardless of the network device's configuration, it may employ one ormore memories or memory modules (including memory 806) configured tostore program instructions for the general-purpose network operationsand mechanisms for roaming, route optimization and routing functionsdescribed herein. The program instructions may control the operation ofan operating system and/or one or more applications, for example. Thememory or memories may also be configured to store tables such asmobility binding, registration, and association tables, etc. Memory 806could also hold various software containers and virtualized executionenvironments and data.

The network device 800 can also include an application-specificintegrated circuit (ASIC), which can be configured to perform routing,switching, and/or other operations. The ASIC can communicate with othercomponents in the network device 800 via the connection 810, to exchangedata and signals and coordinate various types of operations by thenetwork device 800, such as routing, switching, and/or data storageoperations, for example.

FIG. 9 illustrates a computing system architecture 900 includingcomponents in electrical communication with each other using aconnection 905, such as a bus. System 900 includes a processing unit(CPU or processor) 910 and a system connection 905 that couples varioussystem components including the system memory 915, such as read onlymemory (ROM) 920 and random access memory (RAM) 925, to the processor910. The system 900 can include a cache of high-speed memory connecteddirectly with, in close proximity to, or integrated as part of theprocessor 910. The system 900 can copy data from the memory 915 and/orthe storage device 930 to the cache 912 for quick access by theprocessor 910. In this way, the cache can provide a performance boostthat avoids processor 910 delays while waiting for data. These and othermodules can control or be configured to control the processor 910 toperform various actions. Other system memory 915 may be available foruse as well. The memory 915 can include multiple different types ofmemory with different performance characteristics. The processor 910 caninclude any general purpose processor and a hardware or softwareservice, such as service 1 932, service 2 934, and service 3 936 storedin storage device 930, configured to control the processor 910 as wellas a special-purpose processor where software instructions areincorporated into the actual processor design. The processor 910 may bea completely self-contained computing system, containing multiple coresor processors, a bus, memory controller, cache, etc. A multi-coreprocessor may be symmetric or asymmetric.

To enable user interaction with the computing device 900, an inputdevice 945 can represent any number of input mechanisms, such as amicrophone for speech, a touch-sensitive screen for gesture or graphicalinput, keyboard, mouse, motion input, speech and so forth. An outputdevice 935 can also be one or more of a number of output mechanismsknown to those of skill in the art. In some instances, multimodalsystems can enable a user to provide multiple types of input tocommunicate with the computing device 900. The communications interface940 can generally govern and manage the user input and system output.There is no restriction on operating on any particular hardwarearrangement and therefore the basic features here may easily besubstituted for improved hardware or firmware arrangements as they aredeveloped.

Storage device 930 is a non-volatile memory and can be a hard disk orother types of computer readable media which can store data that areaccessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memorycards, solid state memory devices, digital versatile disks, cartridges,random access memories (RAMs) 925, read only memory (ROM) 920, andhybrids thereof.

The storage device 930 can include services 932, 934, 936 forcontrolling the processor 910. Other hardware or software modules arecontemplated. The storage device 930 can be connected to the systemconnection 905. In one aspect, a hardware module that performs aparticular function can include the software component stored in acomputer-readable medium in connection with the necessary hardwarecomponents, such as the processor 910, connection 905, output device935, and so forth, to carry out the function.

For clarity of explanation, in some instances the present technology maybe presented as including individual functional blocks includingfunctional blocks comprising devices, device components, steps orroutines in a method embodied in software, or combinations of hardwareand software.

In some embodiments the computer-readable storage devices, mediums, andmemories can include a cable or wireless signal containing a bit streamand the like. However, when mentioned, non-transitory computer-readablestorage media expressly exclude media such as energy, carrier signals,electromagnetic waves, and signals per se.

Methods according to the above-described examples can be implementedusing computer-executable instructions that are stored or otherwiseavailable from computer readable media. Such instructions can comprise,for example, instructions and data which cause or otherwise configure ageneral purpose computer, special purpose computer, or special purposeprocessing device to perform a certain function or group of functions.Portions of computer resources used can be accessible over a network.The computer executable instructions may be, for example, binaries,intermediate format instructions such as assembly language, firmware, orsource code. Examples of computer-readable media that may be used tostore instructions, information used, and/or information created duringmethods according to described examples include magnetic or opticaldisks, flash memory, USB devices provided with non-volatile memory,networked storage devices, and so on.

Devices implementing methods according to these disclosures can comprisehardware, firmware and/or software, and can take any of a variety ofform factors. Typical examples of such form factors include laptops,smart phones, small form factor personal computers, personal digitalassistants, rackmount devices, standalone devices, and so on.Functionality described herein also can be embodied in peripherals oradd-in cards. Such functionality can also be implemented on a circuitboard among different chips or different processes executing in a singledevice, by way of further example.

The instructions, media for conveying such instructions, computingresources for executing them, and other structures for supporting suchcomputing resources are means for providing the functions described inthese disclosures.

Although a variety of examples and other information was used to explainaspects within the scope of the appended claims, no limitation of theclaims should be implied based on particular features or arrangements insuch examples, as one of ordinary skill would be able to use theseexamples to derive a wide variety of implementations. Further andalthough some subject matter may have been described in languagespecific to examples of structural features and/or method steps, it isto be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claimsis not necessarily limited to these described features or acts. Forexample, such functionality can be distributed differently or performedin components other than those identified herein. Rather, the describedfeatures and steps are disclosed as examples of components of systemsand methods within the scope of the appended claims.

Claim language reciting “at least one of” refers to at least one of aset and indicates that one member of the set or multiple members of theset satisfy the claim. For example, claim language reciting “at leastone of A and B” means A, B, or A and B.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: obtaining a logical model ofa software-defined network, the logical model comprising rules specifiedfor the software-defined network, the logical model being based on aschema defining manageable objects and object properties for thesoftware-defined network; obtaining, for each network device from one ormore network devices in the software-defined network, a separatehardware model, the separate hardware model comprising rules at thenetwork device, the rules corresponding to a respective device-specificrepresentation of the logical model; and based on the logical model andthe separate hardware model associated with the one or more networkdevices, performing an equivalency check between the rules in thelogical model and the rules in the separate hardware model to determinewhether the logical model and the separate hardware model containconfiguration inconsistencies.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein therules in the logical model are defined via contracts configured on acontroller associated with the software-defined network, and wherein therules in the respective hardware model comprise rules rendered on theone or more network devices based on the contracts.
 3. The method ofclaim 2, further comprising: for each of the contracts associated with aset of packets in the logical model, generating a first respective datastructure representing one or more values in the contract; for each ofthe rules rendered on the one or more network devices associated withthe set of packets, generating a second respective data structurerepresenting one or more values in the rule; and wherein performing theequivalency check comprises comparing the first respective datastructure with the second respective data structure.
 4. The method ofclaim 3, wherein the first respective data structure and the secondrespective data structure comprise at least one of an n-bit vector, ann-bit representation, or a reduced ordered binary decision diagram. 5.The method of claim 4, wherein the one or more values in each contractand the one or more values in each rule is represented by a respectiven-bit vector, wherein generating the first respective data structure andthe second respective data structure comprises: for each bit in therespective n-bit vector representing the one or more values in thecontract, computing the set of packets associated with the contract; foreach bit in the respective n-bit vector representing the one or morevalues in the rule, computing the set of packets associated with therule; and wherein comparing the first respective data structure with thesecond respective data structure comprises comparing the respectiven-bit vector and the set of packets computed for the contract with therespective n-bit vector and the set of packets computed for the rule. 6.The method of claim 5, wherein each respective set of packets isrepresented by one or more reduced ordered binary decision diagrams,each of the one or more reduced ordered binary decision diagrams beingbased on a bit in the respective n-bit vector.
 7. The method of claim 6,wherein the one or more values in the contract and the one or morevalues in the rule are associated with a respective quality-of-servicepolicy.
 8. The method of claim 6, wherein performing the equivalencycheck to determine whether the logical model and the separate hardwaremodel contain configuration inconsistencies comprises determining thatthe logical model and the separate hardware model contain aninconsistent quality-of-service rule when comparing the respective n-bitvector and the set of packets computed for the inconsistentquality-of-service rule in the contract with the respective n-bit vectorand the set of packets computed for the inconsistent quality-of-servicerule in the separate hardware model does not yield a match.
 9. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the manageable objects comprise at least oneof contracts, tenants, endpoint groups, contexts, subjects, or filters,and wherein the schema comprises a hierarchical management informationtree.
 10. A system comprising: one or more processors; and at least onecomputer-readable storage medium having stored therein instructionswhich, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to:obtain a logical model of a software-defined network, the logical modelcomprising rules specified for the software-defined network, the logicalmodel being based on a schema defining manageable objects and objectproperties for the software-defined network; obtain, for each networkdevice from one or more network devices in the software-defined network,a separate hardware model, the separate hardware model comprising rulesat the network device, the rules corresponding to a respectivedevice-specific representation of the logical model; and based on thelogical model and the separate hardware model associated with the one ormore network devices, perform an equivalency check between the rules inthe logical model and the rules in the separate hardware model todetermine whether the logical model and the separate hardware modelcontain configuration inconsistencies.
 11. The system of claim 10, theat least one computer-readable storage medium storing additionalinstructions which, when executed by the one or more processors, causethe system to: for each of the contracts associated with a set ofpackets in the logical model, generate a first respective data structurerepresenting one or more values in the contract; for each of the rulesrendered on the one or more network devices associated with the set ofpackets, generate a second respective data structure representing one ormore values in the rule; and wherein performing the equivalency checkcomprises comparing the first respective data structure with the secondrespective data structure.
 12. The system of claim 11, wherein the firstrespective data structure and the second respective data structurecomprise at least one of a bit vector, an n-bit representation, or areduced ordered binary decision diagram.
 13. The system of claim 12,wherein the one or more values in each contract and the one or morevalues in each rule are represented by a respective bit vector, whereingenerating the first respective data structure and the second respectivedata structure comprises: for each bit in the respective bit vectorrepresenting the one or more values in the contract, computing the setof packets associated with the contract; for each bit in the respectivebit vector representing the one or more values in the rule, computingthe set of packets associated with the rule; and wherein comparing thefirst respective data structure with the second respective datastructure comprises comparing the respective bit vector and the set ofpackets associated with the contract with the respective bit vector andthe set of packets associated with the rule.
 14. The system of claim 13,wherein each of the set of packets is represented by one or more reducedordered binary decision diagrams.
 15. The system of claim 14, whereinperforming the equivalency check to determine whether the logical modeland the separate hardware model contain configuration inconsistenciescomprises determining that the logical model and the separate hardwaremodel contain an inconsistency when the respective bit vector associatedwith the contract and the respective bit vector associated with the rulein the separate hardware model do not match for the set of packets. 16.The system of claim 10, wherein the rules in the logical model aredefined via contracts configured on a controller associated with thesoftware-defined network, and wherein the rules in the separate hardwaremodel comprise rules rendered on the one or more network devices basedon the contracts.
 17. A non-transitory computer-readable storage mediumcomprising: instructions stored therein instructions which, whenexecuted by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to:obtain a logical model of a software-defined network, the logical modelcomprising rules specified for the software-defined network, the logicalmodel being based on a schema defining manageable objects and objectproperties for the software-defined network; obtain, for each networkdevice from one or more network devices in the software-defined network,a separate hardware model, the separate hardware model comprising rulesat the network device, the rules corresponding to a respectivedevice-specific representation of the logical model; and based on thelogical model and the separate hardware model associated with the one ormore network devices, perform an equivalency check between the rules inthe logical model and the rules in the separate hardware model todetermine whether the logical model and the separate hardware modelcontain configuration inconsistencies.
 18. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of claim 17, storing additionalinstructions which, when executed by the one or more processors, causethe system to: for each of the contracts associated with a set ofpackets in the logical model, generate a first respective data structurerepresenting one or more values in the contract; for each of the rulesrendered on the one or more network devices associated with a set ofpackets, generate a second respective data structure representing one ormore values in the rule; and wherein performing the equivalency checkcomprises comparing the first respective data structure with the secondrespective data structure.
 19. The non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium of claim 18, wherein the first respective data structureand the second respective data structure comprise reduced ordered binarydecision diagrams, wherein comparing the first respective data structurewith the second respective data structure comprises determining whethera first respective reduced ordered binary decision diagram representinga first quality-of-service rule corresponding to the set of packets inthe logical model overlaps with a second respective reduced orderedbinary decision diagram representing a second quality-of-service rulecorresponding to the set of packets in the separate hardware model. 20.The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17, whereinthe rules in the logical model comprise contracts configured on acontroller associated with the software-defined network, and wherein therules in the separate hardware model are rendered on the one or morenetwork devices based on the contracts.